

# CIA AND AMERICAN LABOR

THE SUBVERSION OF THE  
AFL-CIO'S FOREIGN POLICY

by George Morris



Kronert

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## Introduction

On May 22, 1966, Victor Reuther, international affairs director of the United Automobile Workers, charged that the AFL-CIO's department on international affairs is "involved" with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The AFL-CIO and some of its affiliates "have permitted themselves to be used by the Central Intelligence Agency as a cover for clandestine operations abroad," he said. "The tragedy of AFL-CIO activities in foreign affairs is that they are a vest pocket operation of Jay Lovestone," Reuther continued, and as long as that is so, there will be "no changes in the federation's foreign policy" (*Detroit Free Press*, May 23, 1966).

The official policy of AFL and CIO before they merged in 1955, and of the combined organization since, has been to support the cold war and every military venture of the United States under that course. The suspicion has long been widespread that the men working under AFL-CIO President George Meany and Jay Lovestone, his global affairs operational man since World War II, actually serve the CIA in various parts of the world. But Reuther's charge was the first made by a top labor official.

Victor Reuther is certainly in a position to

know the inside affairs of the AFL-CIO's international department. He has been associated with it as a member from its beginning and he was in the CIO's department on international affairs before that. For some 20 years he has handled the international business of the UAW and has been assistant to his brother, Walter, the union's president.

Victor Reuther's remarks were but a hint of the sharp rift developing in the AFL-CIO over foreign policy questions. Only a few months earlier, in December 1965, the San Francisco convention of the AFL-CIO, with seeming unanimity, gave approval to the operations under Meany and Lovestone and pledged "unstinting support" for the government's Vietnam war policy. But it soon became apparent that the convention displayed a false front. A number of later conventions of major unions either ignored the pledge or showed no enthusiasm for it. Some, like the UAW, backtracked considerably from the San Francisco position toward an earlier, less warlike policy. In the eyes of Meany and Lovestone, the cardinal sin was a section in the UAW resolution calling for friendlier ties with the Soviet Union and for expansion of people-to-people exchanges with the socialist countries.

Within weeks came sharp, widely publicized exchanges between the Reuther brothers and the Meany-Lovestone team over support by the AFL-CIO of a CIA-backed labor group in

the Dominican Republic, the boycott Meany ordered of the International Labor Organization conference because a representative of Poland was elected its chairman, the intervention of Lovestone with the State Department to stop visas for a Soviet trade union delegation invited to the United States by the UAW, and finally over a resolution reaffirming the San Francisco policy on Vietnam.

By the end of 1966 tension between the Meany-Lovestone group and the leadership of the UAW became so sharp that Walter Reuther announced his union would henceforth follow a course independent of AFL-CIO policies. This was followed by a letter to all locals of the union setting forth the UAW's executive board's position that the differences are not only over foreign affairs but fall under ten major topics affecting the course of the trade unions (*New York Times*, Dec. 30, 1966). Then, in February 1967, Walter Reuther resigned from the vice-presidency and the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO. Obviously, the differences are far-reaching.

The charge of "involvement" with the CIA was not an off-the-cuff remark by Reuther. For some time, various periodicals had carried material pointing to the very close relations between the federation's foreign activities and the CIA. The *Washington Post*, the Capital's leading daily, ran a four-part

series (Dec. 30, 1965—Jan. 2, 1966) that was in effect an exposure of Lovestone's connections with the CIA.

Significantly, Reuther made his charge in the midst of a developing public furor over the CIA and during the debate in Congress over the very modest proposal to add three members to a Senate committee supposedly looking into the affairs of the super-secret agency. For the first time the public was getting a glimpse of the CIA. The exposure of its 1961 invasion of Cuba that turned into a fiasco in the Bay of Pigs, and the wide circulation of the book, *The Invisible Government* by David Wise and Thomas B. Ross (New York, 1964), opened the floodgates of publicity on the CIA. The *New York Times* ran a not-too-friendly five-part series April 25–29, 1966, on the cloak-and-dagger outfit. Reuther's charge, therefore, placed the AFL-CIO's world affairs department into a context that was hardly popular.

Conditions have changed in the world and in the United States. Until recently most people knew little of the CIA, or they simply considered it an espionage agency in the usual sense. Of course, those who support the cold war have no objection to any agency used to further it. But with the "ugly American" image getting uglier—especially with escalation of the Vietnam war, while social programs at home fall by the wayside—the attitude of many people has also changed.

The CIA has become abhorrent to millions of Americans. Some universities that had in one way or another been involved in CIA projects in Vietnam or elsewhere, have hastened to disassociate themselves from the agency, asserting they were not involved "knowingly."

The popular revulsion to the CIA was reflected by a letter in the *New York Times* (May 29, 1966)\* from a dozen members of the Department of Anthropology of Michigan State University which, along with other institutions, was recently disclosed as having contracted for certain CIA projects (MSU's was in Vietnam). The anthropologists complained bitterly that the exposure handicaps their activities abroad. They wrote:

"Our professional interests as anthropologists require us, like our colleagues at other universities, to spend a good deal of time carrying out basic field research in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. It is unfortunate that on occasion, some of our field research is jeopardized because anthropologists overseas generally work under the handicap of being suspected of CIA associations. Given this general handicap, our position is now rendered doubly difficult because the university with which we are affiliated has itself become suspect."

The anthropologists suggested that "sub-

\* Coincidentally, the same week Victor Reuther's statement was reported.

rosa involvement of government intelligence agencies in university projects" be prohibited by law. They did not take into account, however, the ways and means to get an "invisible government" to obey such laws. An agency that violates international law with "sub-rosa" invasions of many lands, that interferes in the affairs of governments at peace with the United States and even plots their overthrow, that organizes U-2 spy-flights over other countries, is hardly likely to pay attention to the suggested laws.

On November 17, 1966, the annual convention of the Anthropological Association in Pittsburgh heard a report by its former president, Dr. Ralph A. Beals, in which, according to the *New York Times* (Nov. 18, 1966), he charged that scholars are offered generous sums by the government to serve as intelligence agents during their work abroad and that some intelligence agents were posing as anthropologists. He cited several cases where the State Department or universities had to cancel projects when the connection was exposed. Following the report of Dr. Beals, the convention protested CIA intrusion in the work of the scientists and backed a resolution critical of the policy in Vietnam. A similar trend was evident in the protest activities at a number of university campuses against CIA recruiting among students.

On July 28, 1966, J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-

mittee, asked CIA director Richard Helms at a public hearing to explain reports that his agency is involved in union affairs and takes part in union elections (*New York Times*, July 29). The reply was not made public.

On February 14, 1967, came the disclosure that since the early fifties the heads of the National Student Association secretly received from the CIA millions of dollars to finance activities in student movements abroad. Those activities were mainly in African and other developing countries, and many clearly fell into the espionage category. Sparked by an advance announcement of the exposure in the March 1967 issue of *Ramparts* magazine, the new revelations also took Washington and the White House by surprise. In an effort to stem the renewed public criticism of the CIA, President Johnson quickly ordered a halt to all CIA funds for the NSA and other private anti-Communist student and youth activities. In Congress a cry was raised for an investigation.

Eugene Groves, president of the 1.5 million-member NSA, admitted secret financing by the CIA, but held that the organization had stopped taking CIA money since 1965 and was moving away from the cold war position to a "liberal" one against the Vietnam policy. Recognizing the widespread opposition to the CIA on U.S. campuses, Groves was also worried that NSA's activities

abroad would be torpedoed by the exposure. Other spokesmen for NSA (as quoted in the *New York Times*, Feb. 15) found links to the CIA so repugnant that they doubted the organization could survive the blow. One officer said "ninety per cent of them (the members) wouldn't have had anything to do with the organization if they'd known about the CIA business before they joined." The State Department, too, was forced to admit publicly that the CIA has been financing those frequently publicised "pro-American" or "pro-West" NSA-sponsored student actions abroad, as well as scholarships for African students.

The exposure also revealed how foundations bearing innocent names serve as conduits for the CIA in the transfer of funds for "good causes." As reported in the *Times* of February 15 and in *Ramparts* magazine, CIA passed its money to NSA annually through such foundations, naming the Independent Foundation of Boston; the Sidney and Esther Rabb Foundation of Boston; the San Jacinto Foundation of Houston; the Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs of New York, and the previously exposed J. M. Kaplan Fund of New York.

In the light of the above examples of CIA intrusion into science and education, Victor Reuther's charges are hardly surprising.

In the midst of popular criticism of the CIA, the Meany group chose to meet

Reuther's charges with silence and announced the matter would come up later at a meeting of the Executive Council. The tactic was an old one: wait until the issue is disposed of in Congress and publicity dies down, then rely on Meany's big majority in the Council to simply reject the charge. That's just what happened. On August 22, Meany announced that the Council "rejects out of hand the campaign of vilification directed against it," and adopted a statement praising the work of the American Institute for Free Labor Development, whose activities Victor Reuther cited to back his charges. When asked what the specific charges were, Meany replied, "fomenting revolutions, running training schools for company unions and acting as an agent of the State Department and CIA." When newsmen pressed him to explain what prompted such serious charges, Meany shot back, "Does the *Daily Worker* need prompting to vilify the AFL-CIO?"

The newsmen, however, did not accept this transparent McCarthyism for an answer and Meany had to concede that "some other publications" also gave publicity to Reuther's charges. In fact, these included such papers as the *Los Angeles Times*, *Detroit Free Press*, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, *Washington Post*, *New York Times* and others that ran the story. Actually, Meany tried indirectly to red-bait the Reuthers with his tactic, thus giving some indication of the intensity of the con-

flict in the AFL-CIO's top leadership. Another indication of the tensions came on the following day when the council passed a resolution on Vietnam designed fully to please President Johnson. Walter Reuther, who did not attend that session, issued a statement that the resolution "was intemperate, hysterical, jingoistic and unworthy of the policy statement of a free labor movement." He added, "Had I been present, I would have opposed the statement and voted against it."

The Executive Council's dismissal of Reuther's charges was not surprising. The action recalls the treatment the Council gave a "Memorandum on Civil Rights" documenting racial discrimination in the trade unions, submitted on June 25, 1961, by A. Philip Randolph, the AFL-CIO's only Negro vice-president. Meany named a commission to study the document. On October 12, 1961, the Council received the commission's report, which denied Randolph's discrimination accusation and turned the charge around, citing the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, Randolph's union, as *the sole "racist" union in the AFL-CIO because almost all the porters are Negro!* The Council approved that report. Later that year, when the leadership submitted the report to the convention in Miami Beach, anger ran so high among the delegates that a motion to withdraw it

and expunge it from the record was accepted and passed unanimously.

Machine majorities at Executive Council meetings have never settled issues in the labor movement. The Reuther charge has introduced the question for open debate in the ranks. The real question is how it came about that the union leadership became "involved" with the CIA? What is the foreign policy of the AFL-CIO? Where does it lead to?

It will be shown in this book that the AFL-CIO's international affairs department, with its millions of dollars of expenditures from a special assessment, was involved in intelligence activities even before the CIA was established. We will show that this type of activity flowed from a long-standing policy of the old AFL in support of United States imperialism, especially since World War I. And before examining Reuther's charge of cooperation with the CIA, we will discuss briefly the nature of that agency and why it wants a "labor" mask.

Needless to say, the ensuing discussion is not motivated by an "anti-labor" approach in any sense. On the contrary, we are concerned with the antipathy toward the unions and their characterization as a reactionary force in society today by sections of the population that have been historically allied to labor and who generally support progressive

causes. Ironically, this attitude has widened with the expansion of the peace movement. Many people are dismayed to see the men who speak for labor among those who beat the war drums loudest. They see labor's image in the faces and names in the news media—George Meany, David Dubinsky, George Harrison, Jay Lovestone, the most rabid cold warriors in the labor movement.

Many people think these men reflect the views of the AFL-CIO's 13 million members and in their mind the federation shares the "ugly American" image. This is true throughout the world. The AFL-CIO is becoming more and more isolated from the world's labor movement. People abroad are even more puzzled by the spectacle of labor leaders among the war hawks. Not one trade union movement abroad has followed Meany and Lovestone with a pledge of "unstinting support" for the Vietnam war. From the occasional bit of news that trickles through, it appears that even the unions of South Vietnam are fighting the puppet government there.

In our view those who throw all U.S. trade unionists and leaders in one pot with the Meanys and Lovestones are mistaken. Those familiar with the trade unions know there are considerable differences among leaders and within unions. Many, at various leadership levels, are critical of the Meany policy. The critics are by no means of one voice.

Some may not go as far as might be desired. But in face of the sharpening struggle over foreign policy within the AFL-CIO leadership, it is not only mistaken to say labor is reactionary but it is wrong from a tactical standpoint. For the first time since the cold war began, the friends of the CIA are challenged within their own circle. At stake is not only the issue of peace but also the independence of unions and their freedom to act in the true interests of their members. If, as Victor Reuther charges, the AFL-CIO's international relations are connected with the CIA, where is the real authority? In the tunnels of the "invisible government" or in the councils of unions?

## The "Invisible Government"

The Central Intelligence Agency, when formally constituted in 1947, was designed to become the hub of the entire system of coordinated intelligence services that had been in operation. In his book *Craft of Intelligence* (New York, 1963), Allen Dulles glorified the CIA as heir to a tradition of intelligence dating back to Revolutionary War days and even to ancient times.

The defenders of the CIA have pictured it as just an old "necessity" brought up to date with all the techniques that the electronic and atomic age offers. They rely on the general acceptance of intelligence as an unavoidable adjunct to war and military machines. But never before was there such a public outcry against an intelligence agency as in the recent period against the CIA. Since the Bay of Pigs fiasco, much "now-it-can-be-told" literature has given the public its first look into the CIA. The people saw much more than the glamorized spy activity fed to them on TV and in literature. They learned that many events that have shamed the United States before the world were CIA operations; that the CIA has the means to mobilize sizable armed forces and military

equipment to invade countries and overthrow governments, and is actually an "invisible government" through which policies are carried out that are directly opposite to those voiced in lofty presidential statements to the people.

Wise and Ross estimate that the CIA's annual expenditures come to about \$4 billion. Nobody knows the CIA's actual budget. The law under which it was established allows such strict secrecy that it doesn't have to give an accounting to anyone. A special Senate committee simply gives blanket approval for any funds the CIA requests, with no questions asked. The agency secretly employs an estimated 200,000 persons, according to Wise and Ross. Much of the CIA's expenditure is channeled through dummy companies, or in contracts with universities arranged through an assortment of endowment funds, bearing innocent names. Inflated embassy staffs in many countries give agents diplomatic cover. The CIA also trains people for sabotage activities and even assassinations, according to some authorities. It commands many subsidiary outfits for operation of propaganda stations, like "Radio Free Europe" and the "Swan Island" station in the Caribbean. It subsidizes books and special issues of magazines that fit into its plans.

Operating as an independent machinery out of its \$46-million, 125-acre hideaway

near Langley, Va., the CIA places its own orders for spy planes, arms, ships, photographic technology and all else it needs for export of counterrevolution. And those are very lucrative orders yielding a high profit, because bidding upon them is not very open or competitive.

Unstable governments, especially the many new states in Africa or Asia that have not had a long enough opportunity to consolidate popular support, are easy marks for the CIA's operations. Fred Cook wrote in *The Nation* (June 24, 1961) that the CIA is a "two-headed monster"; it is not only a cloak-and-dagger agency to collect intelligence, it also "has the authority to act on its own information." The more the public saw of its activities, the greater became the concern and suspicion of its role. The *New York Times* reported that in its 19-year history, some 150 resolutions have been introduced in Congress calling for some type of control over the two-headed monster. All those resolutions died in pigeon-holes or were killed.

Wise and Ross write that there are two governments in the United States, one visible, the other invisible; one people read about and children study about, the other a global empire for espionage and for making decisions in secrecy affecting war or peace. Their description rings true. Within a span of months the people experienced a presidential campaign during which a pledge of peace was

the strongest vote-getter, followed by what looked like countermanding orders from an invisible power for rapid escalation of the war in Vietnam. But is the CIA really an *independent* "invisible government"? Wise and Ross give a mountain of facts from which it can be adduced that there is only a division of work to meet diplomatic and international legal requirements. The White House knows, or is made aware of every important step of the CIA.

In a basic sense, the CIA is an outgrowth of the present stage of United States imperialism. The legislation to set it up was part of the mass of legislation and executive orders in the 1946-47 period, which served to implement the policy of cold war against the socialist lands and the effort to penetrate new nations once dominated by European colonial powers.

Ironically, the CIA boasts (according to the *New York Times* series) that it has "more liberals per square inch" than will be found in any other sphere of activity in the country. By "liberals" it means the army of scientists, economic and social analysts, researchers and such, employed to keep track of social-political developments in every spot on the globe. This is needed to judge how ripe an area might be for CIA operations. But the *Times* also notes that when it comes to the "dirty tricks" departments, the personnel tends to be further "to the right." These departments

actually plan sabotage, assassinations, boycotts, and invasions of lands that have become CIA objectives. These departments arrange operations like the Bay of Pigs, the Dominican Republic invasion, the Congo mercenary army, and such preliminary activities as those that were begun in Vietnam when the French left.

### *The Era of Paramilitarism*

An unusually frank report on the kind of planning discussed in government circles was published in the *Wall Street Journal* (May 6, 1961). Henry Gemmill, that paper's Washington reporter, wrote: "Undercover paramilitary technique of warfare . . . now appears more firmly established as national policy than it was before the recent resounding failure of the paramilitary invasion of Cuba. . . . The tests would be simple: is this venture one which can succeed in disguise and can the disguise be credibly maintained? If the answer is affirmative, there would be no scruples against using whatever tactics come to hand."

This technique of warfare, Gemmill continued, "runs to specific forms of sabotage, terror, organized mob action and corruption of specific target nations. . . . Those tactics could vary with opportunity and necessity and would be employed both offensively against nations of the Red bloc and de-

fensively within selected allied and neutralist lands. While the 'nice' side of many a venture would be well publicised, the 'dirty' side would be covert and rely heavily on non-American agents subject to strict U.S. discipline: if those were uncovered the American Government would stoutly disavow them."

The United States, Gemmill went on, "still nominally at peace, would become committed to constant undeclared acts involving more or less violence upon hostile and friendly territory, until the unforeseeable end of the cold war." The greater emphasis, he stressed, will be on the "dirty" techniques.

"Unquestionably it is a doctrine which would concentrate on brutalities performed in the dark: honorable men of high rank now sit in this city calmly discussing the possibility of such things as methodical assassination of Communist leaders abroad," Gemmill reported. "Any paramilitary program, large or small, can by-pass established governmental mechanisms of review—of check and balance. An offensive involving vast stakes can be decided upon in secret by a few highly-placed officials, then executed without scanning by congressional committees which normally deal with appropriations, foreign affairs and armed services."

Gemmill asks whether the "structure of U.S. society can adjust successfully" to such a course, and concludes that, "the tradition

of an informed public, the constitutional rights of the Senate to advise on foreign policy and of Congress to declare war—those and other deeply engrained features of the American society would seem to be in basic contradiction with paramilitarism.”

The conclusions drawn after the Bay of Pigs, then, were not to restrain the CIA but rather to “perfect” its techniques on the basis of the experiences in Cuba, Guatemala, Iran (where Allen Dulles had directed the operation that overthrew the Mossadegh regime of 1953 to prevent nationalization of that country’s rich oil reserves), the so-called Berlin “revolt” of 1953, and, it need hardly be added, in Vietnam.

The CIA was especially fitted to serve as an international secret police force when the perspective of the so-called “American Century” and United States “world leadership” began to emerge immediately after World War II. It was to become an instrument for neo-colonialism—the use of subtle and indirect forms of domination over peoples behind the facade of their independence. Such an instrument became necessary for United States imperialism as older and weakened European colonialist powers, faced with liberation struggles in Africa, Asia and Latin America, were forced, at least formally, to relinquish their rule. In the race for renewed controls over newly-independent peoples through influence on key industries

and trade, bribery, puppets and mercenary armies, the United States was far ahead of the colonialist powers, because it falsely paraded as a benevolent friend of small nations, with no history of imperialism. Actually, the United States has a long history of imperialism in Latin America where it continues to dominate lands that are formally independent states, not to speak of its own colonialism in Puerto Rico and the Philippines.

Notwithstanding the forms, the power based in Washington and Wall Street bears all the basic characteristics of imperialism that have marked the European colonial powers. The CIA is the major instrument for an up-to-date practice of that policy.

### *“Military-Industrial Complex”*

Characteristic of the role of the CIA are the men (in General Eisenhower’s words) of the “military-industrial complex” who direct it. This “invisible government,” with authority over affairs that can ignite an atomic war, is run only by top military men and executives of major corporations. Nothing could be sweeter for the corporations fortunate enough to have their own men in that inner circle. The CIA gives out lush orders. Its expense account is unlimited. It needn’t give an accounting to anyone. There is no real bidding on its contracts; they are very profitable. Moreover, it is the accepted rule

in the CIA, as in all top military circles, that the military man almost surely winds up as an executive of a corporation interested in military orders.

Allen Dulles, the "father" of the CIA, who was its director from 1953 to 1961, is a man with considerable corporation holdings. But his major power derives from his position as head of Sullivan & Cromwell, the most influential corporation law firm on Wall Street with connections among the peak circles of big business.

Walter Bedell Smith, CIA director until 1953, was Eisenhower's chief-of-staff in World War II. After leaving the CIA, he became head of AMF Atonics and a member of the boards of American Machine and Foundry, Associated Missile Products, and Industrial Reactors Laboratories.

John McCone, director from 1961 to 1965, was Undersecretary of the Air Force during the Korean War, and is a big shareholder in Standard Oil of California. He made tremendous profits out of shipbuilding during the war.

Admiral William F. Raborn, director for 14 months, 1956-66, left the agency to return as chief executive of the Aerojet General Corporation. He was in charge of the Polaris missile project.

On the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board are Frank Pace, Jr., former secretary of the army; Edwin H. Land, presi-

dent of the Polaroid Corporation; William O. Baker, vice-president in charge of research of Bell Telephone Laboratories; Lt. General James H. Doolittle, retired board chairman of Space Technology Laboratories, Inc.; Robert D. Murphy, former undersecretary of state, now president of Corning Glass; Gordon Gray, formerly head of the Office of Defense Mobilization who became vice-president of R. J. Reynolds and a newspaper publisher, and Augustus Long, a former top executive of the Texas Company.

Alongside these businessmen, whose companies are in fields most directly related to supplying paramilitary operations, are important military men, including General Maxwell D. Taylor, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Johnson's former Ambassador to Vietnam, and John H. Sides, commander of the Pacific fleet in 1960-1963. McGeorge Bundy was one of the major architects of Vietnam policy and was the President's direct representative among those insiders in intelligence, a position of importance second only to director of the CIA. In 1966 he resigned to become head of the Ford Foundation. Later, Clark Clifford, a Washington lawyer for big business interests, became chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to the President.

There is no person in this inner sanctum of intelligence who could be considered a "public" representative. Even the most con-

servative labor leaders are not trusted near the intelligence setup. This body of military and corporation men command a world-wide machine of persons "under official cover overseas," numbering as many as are employed in the entire diplomatic service, according to Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., close advisor to John F. Kennedy, in his book *A Thousand Days* (New York, 1965). That means some 6,000 CIA agents carry diplomatic designations.

The harmless kitten the CIA was supposed to be when President Truman instituted it in 1947, grew into a beast for which no one seems to want to take responsibility. As the public outcry grows for controls over it, the very men who brought it into existence have tried to shake off responsibility. Harry S. Truman in a syndicated article for the North American Newspaper Alliance (Dec. 12, 1963) wrote that he "would like the CIA to be restored to its original assignment as an intelligence arm of the President and whatever else it can properly perform in that special field. There is something about the way the CIA has been functioning that is casting a shadow over our historic position and I feel that we need to correct it."

President Eisenhower, under whom Allen Dulles and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, his brother, made the CIA the monster it is, issued a warning in his last speech as President on January 17, 1961. He

said: "We have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. . . . We annually spend on military security alone more than the net income of all the corporations. Now this conjunction of immense military establishment and a large armaments industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political and even spiritual—is felt in every city, every state house, every office of the federal government. . . . Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

"In the councils of government we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will continue to persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. . . ."

No one was in a better position to know the "military-industrial complex" than Dwight Eisenhower. The CIA is the model of the danger he pictured—and to which his administration contributed.

What can the labor movement have in common with the CIA? It is not generally known that in the same period in which Congress implemented cold war legislation, it also enacted measures for involving the

labor movement, including a role in intelligence.

A Department of Labor pamphlet issued in February 1960, entitled *The Role of the U.S. Department of Labor in Foreign Affairs*, said the Foreign Service Act of 1946 provided a role for the Department of Labor "in the overall management of the foreign service. . . . Within this framework the Labor Department has placed emphasis on the labor aspects of the Foreign Service's responsibilities. In 1960 there were some 50 labor attaches stationed throughout the world and in Washington. More than 100 additional Foreign Service Officers supplemented the work of the labor attaches by serving as part-time labor officers at posts where labor attaches are not assigned." Since 1960 the number of labor attaches has grown several-fold. In many places they are supplemented by labor information officers. They are recruited almost entirely from union staffs on recommendation of labor leaders. Many of them are screened for political reliability by Jay Lovestone.

Former CIA Director William F. Raborn, in an interview with *US News and World Report* (July 18, 1966) explains that the CIA gathers much of its intelligence through persons in the Foreign Service. Raborn lists the various sources, among them labor attaches, as "elements of the intelligence community." He said all of them "provide

department intelligence for the specific needs of the specific departments," and are made "available to the CIA."

It should be kept in mind that the same Congress that enacted laws setting up the CIA also passed the Taft-Hartley law designed to stop labor's progress. It required officers of every union applying for the services of the National Labor Relations Board and a right to have its name on a collective bargaining election ballot, to submit to the government an affidavit that they are not Communists or members of organizations that allegedly advocate the overthrow of the government by force. Its purpose was to purge unions of militant progressive leadership and opponents of the cold war.

## The Anti-Communism Thesis

The charge of AFL-CIO involvement with the CIA suggests the question: who *really* decides the federation's course on foreign affairs? It is certainly not the membership of the affiliated unions. Nor have the overwhelming majority of the trade union leaders much say in that department. However, control of foreign affairs by a tiny clique at the top does not explain how it came about that official policy of the AFL-CIO responds like an echo to everything that comes out of the Pentagon or the CIA.

For an answer to the question we must go back several decades to World War I and its aftermath. Prior to that war, to the extent that unions showed an interest in foreign affairs, it was generally in opposition to United States gun-boat diplomacy in Latin America and Asia. This is documented in Philip S. Foner's *History of the Labor Movement in the United States*, of which four volumes have been published (New York, 1947, 1955, 1964, 1965). The early progressives of America, especially the socialists active in trade union ranks, were a strong influence for the view that workers and their organizations must be an active force for

peace. Foner calls attention to a New York mass meeting of workers in protest against the Mexican War of 1846. During the Civil War, the unions were strongly on the side of the anti-slave North.

In the first major imperialist venture of the United States, the war against Spain in 1898, which gained America its first overseas colonies—the Philippines, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and, less directly, Cuba—Foner shows, the trade unions were in active opposition. He cites widespread protests from the rank and file and the leaders of unions against the war with Spain and the aggressive imperialist trend the war signaled. Much of the labor press reflected the anti-war sentiment.

But Foner also shows that certain union leaders, among them Samuel Gompers, founder and president of the AFL, changed their position to support the war when it began. The reasoning used by such leaders to explain their shift of position still figures strongly in the unprincipled pragmatism of many labor leaders of today. The propaganda of the pro-war McKinley administration then was to “free Cuba.”

Foner writes, “Out of fear of having their ‘Americanism questioned’, Gompers and other labor leaders who understood the unjust character of the war, climbed aboard the warmakers’ wagon and threw overboard their anti-war sentiments. . . . P. J. McGuire (head of the carpenters) put it succinctly in

a letter to Gompers a week after the war started, emphasizing that leaders of the labor movement should quickly abandon their former opposition to the war lest their demands be treated coldly by the government, and that precautions should be taken to make certain that all spokesmen for labor who sought favorable legislation in Congress 'should be men who favor loyal and unstinted support to our Government against Spain in the present War' " (Vol. 2, p. 415).

Foner tells of Andrew Furuseth, who headed the Seamen's Union and who similarly shifted his position. Three years after the war, Furuseth admitted that he supported the war in the belief that by showing labor is "patriotic" the unions could prevent setbacks for the workers during the war. Patriotism in this sense meant blind support of every government act regardless of what the policy might bring. The essential element in their position was the concept that if the unions would give the government a blank check on foreign policy matters, they would get better treatment on domestic issues. One should not judge these labor leaders of 70 years ago too harshly for entertaining such illusions. They headed a labor movement that was still very weak, divided, and with fewer than a million members. There was hardly any protection of the right to organize workers and almost no meaningful social-economic legislation. They reasoned that their influence

was small and that it might be better to be "practical." The tragedy today is that after all the decades of futility in trying to appease imperialism much of the labor leadership still plays the same deadly game.

### *Imperialist Influence*

It was a generation later, after the ruin and slaughter of World War I, that the influence of imperialism on labor leadership became apparent. With the war came a new era and a basic change in the world. The United States emerged as a major imperialist power and within several years became *the* major imperialist power. The old tsarist empire of Russia was overthrown and the first socialist government was established in its place. It soon became evident that the major adversaries in the world in the years to come would be the forces of imperialism led by the United States, and the rising socialist movements. U.S. troops were shifted to fronts in North Russia and Siberia to join armies of European and Japanese imperialists in an effort to crush the Soviet regime. The effort failed, but for many years the relationship between the Soviet Republic and the capitalist countries was in the nature of an armed truce.

During this period, the union leaders around Gompers and William Green, who succeeded Gompers in 1925, took a position

that was even more hostile toward the Soviet Union, if that were possible, than the government. They opposed diplomatic recognition of the Soviet government, although liberal opinion in the country and some very influential members of the Senate and House, favored it. Even when Franklin D. Roosevelt, as one of his first acts as President in 1933, opened diplomatic relations with the USSR, the AFL's leadership opposed it. The AFL leaders refused to have any relations with Soviet trade unions or to send a delegation to the USSR to inspect their conditions.

The swift rise of the trusts, fattened by unprecedented war profits and benefitting from the new world power position of the United States, was accompanied by a ferocious appetite for expansion abroad and for higher profits at home. The lands of Latin America soon felt the full force of "dollar imperialism" and "gun-boat diplomacy" as big corporations spread their investments to spheres in the domain of other powers. The same arrogance was displayed on the home front to whip it into line for the new era. An offensive was opened against the labor movement.

The brutality and murder used to smash the Great Steel Strike of 1919 was a rehearsal for the treatment unions were to get through the "roaring prosperity" of the twenties. The steel struggle, led by William Z. Foster, the first such general strike in an industry that

was the citadel of peak monopoly, demonstrated the rising militancy among workers and a trend for postwar labor progress. The ruling class sensed the significance of that struggle and moved with unprecedented force to crush it.

The technique of "red-baiting," used against unions since the Civil War, now became a major weapon in the anti-union arsenal. The ordinary non-political militant labor leader was marked "red." An anti-red hysteria was launched. The notorious Palmer Raids on the night of January 2, 1920, a nationwide invasion of homes and meetings, netted a total of 6,000 arrests of alleged Communists or "Anarchists." Soon more arrests came and then mass deportations.

### *The American Plan*

The attacks on labor accompanied by the anti-red hysteria inaugurated what the propagandists of capitalism of that day called "the American Plan." Its key was replacement of the legitimate unions by company unions, under which employees were presumably given the right to take up grievances but under limitations that would make the unions useless. The "Yellow Dog" (individual) contract was to substitute for collective agreements. When the "American Plan" had run its course, only about half remained of the 5,000,000 union membership from imme-

diately after the war. Sometimes more workers were in the company unions than in real unions. When the 1929 crash and depression descended with crushing force on the workers, their unions, many of them merely skeletons, were without the strength, spirit or leadership to give them protection.

There were some heroic fights in the twenties. The steel strike was the major example. There were even some thrusts for organization of the unorganized, like the textile strike of 1926 in Passaic, N.J.; the fur and garment strikes of 1926; the Gastonia, N.C., textile strike of 1928; the big New Bedford, Mass., textile strike of 1928; the 15-month coal miners strike of 1927-28; and others. But, far from getting AFL blessings, these efforts were more often denounced as "Communist-led."

The policy of many of the conservative leaders was to appease the companies by yielding to wage cuts and, in effect, acting as company unions. This trend Foster called "trade union capitalism." Takeover by gangsters and assorted racketeers, was also the fate of many unions. The declining effectiveness of unions conditioned some of them to shift to activities other than struggle, to invest union funds in capitalist enterprises. Certain unions sunk, and eventually lost, millions in booming Florida land. Soon there were several dozen union-operated banks. Some leaders said that if unions continued along the "new

path," they might some day dominate the stockmarket. That prediction was settled very soon. Only one labor bank, operated by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, survived the crash of 1929 and is still in business. The others went bankrupt early in the Big Depression. But their heaviest loss was in becoming rusty as unions when their muscle and leadership were most needed. What the twenties did to unionism can be measured by the fact that Gompers (and later Green) was staunchly opposed to unemployment insurance. Not until the bill for unemployment insurance, initiated by an AFL rank and file movement, was sponsored by the New Deal Administration, did Green and his associates on the Executive Council support the idea.

Racketeers of illegal liquor traffic during Prohibition expanded into the labor field and even reached into the Executive Council of the AFL. They were attracted to some unions as hired strong-arm forces to enforce union control where leadership was weak. Before long they became dominant in some unions. Control by beatings, murder and other forms of terror, selling of jobs, kickbacks, extortion from employers for strike insurance and sweetheart contracts, became so widespread that the public was given the false impression that all labor was racket-run.

But the twenties also saw much resistance to labor racketeering and to "trade union capitalism." Many men were killed or

maimed, or driven out of industries, fighting to save their unions from these influences. While the struggles did not stop the defeatist course of labor's "official" leadership, they laid the basis for initiative and leadership in the sweeping struggles of the unemployed when the depression hit, and later in the great CIO organizing drives of the late thirties.

It was not only labor leaders who demonstrated their "patriotism" by anti-communism: the chorus was joined even by notorious racketeers and killers of that "gangster era." Al Capone, the king of the syndicates, said: "Bolshevism is knocking at our gates. We can't afford to let it in. We have to organize ourselves against it and put our shoulders together and hold fast. We must keep America whole and safe and unspoiled. We must keep the worker away from red literature and red ruses; we must see that his mind remains healthy" (quoted in R. Palme Dutt, *Fascism and Social Revolution*, New York, 1934, p. 184).

Some gangsters were invited by leaders to come into the unions and prevent "Communists" from getting elected with popular rank and file support. The Lepke-Gurrah gang once controlled a substantial sector of the fur and garment industries in New York after muscling in as "protectors" against "Communism."

Racism also influenced the labor movement, but that was a phenomenon that came

long before the post-war twenties. However, there were factors in that period that intensified the racist evil. The rate of lynchings was very high. To the racism born out of the long years of slavery, was now added the aggressive expansion of American domination over millions of non-white people abroad.

With shrinking memberships, the entrance of Negroes into unions became even more difficult. The most conservative Negro-excluding craft unions were dominant in the AFL. A major anti-union weapon of employers during the "American Plan" was recruiting Negroes to take the place of white strikers. They were often recruited without being told they were to break strikes. This led to some ugly situations obviously harmful to the cause of working class unity.

In 1928 there were only an estimated 44,000 Negroes in the AFL, according to Sterling B. Spero and Abram L. Harris (*The Black Worker*, New York, 1931). A substantial part of this total were in the Sleeping Car Porters and the South Atlantic and Gulf locals of the longshoremen's union. The historic experience of most developed capitalist countries has been that the pro-imperialist bureaucracy inside labor concentrates for support mainly on higher paid, skilled and better organized white workers. In the United States, the classic position of the old-line craft-based AFL leadership in the twenties and thirties was that only the skilled were or-

ganizable," that unskilled production workers, Negroes who were mostly in the unskilled services and such, could not be relied upon.

As a companion to anti-Communism, the evil of racism was kept alive in the AFL's major unions; as late as the mid-fifties the only Negro delegates to attend AFL conventions were from the small Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, almost all Negroes. A. Philip Randolph made his annual eloquent plea for an end to race bars in the long list of unions he read to the delegates. He received a polite hearing, with the usual reply by William Green that it will take "education" before something can be done. Nothing of significance was done until the pressure of the civil rights movement in the sixties became strong enough to force some reforms.

### *The Weapon of Anti-Communism*

Such was the decade in which American imperialism rose with fresh vigor to become the leading capitalist power. Some in the labor movement thought they could share in the glory of empire and some of its superprofits. As was noted earlier, the seeds of that view were already beginning to sprout during the Spanish-American War, when some leaders tried to justify their support of the war and annexation of territories on the ground that it would bring more economic growth and jobs to the United States.

As the trusts intensified their attacks, the rank and file of many unions pressed for militant counteraction. The AFL leadership found more and more need to red-bait rank and file leaders. The fury of the top leaders associated with Samuel Gompers reached high intensity with the emergence in 1921 of the Trade Union Educational League formed by William Z. Foster. The TUEL campaigned for amalgamation of craft unions, organization of the unorganized, democratic, rank and file control of the unions, an end to discrimination, an end of collaboration with big business and a return to militant struggle. As the TUEL gained support in the unions, even from many local and regional leaders, it expanded its position to denounce United States imperialism and to call for recognition of the Soviet Union.

The major weapon of the top union bureaucracy was to label the movement "Communist." Expulsions of active militants followed, on charges of belonging to a "dual union" as the TUEL was falsely labeled, or for actual or alleged membership in the Communist Party. Some union constitutions began to include provisions barring Communists or persons associating with Communists from membership or denying their right to run for office. The AFL itself soon prohibited persons it judged to be Communists from the right to sit as delegates in its conventions.

Anti-Communism was useful to much of

the top trade union bureaucracy to show their "partnership" with imperialism. But the tactic of labeling all opponents as Communists became a practical weapon to combat advocates of progressive reforms and challenges to leadership that are in no sense related to Communists.

Two generations, of course, have brought changes, even in the old AFL's conservative circles. But George Meany has never tired of emphasizing that there has been no change on anti-communism as the key element in the federation's international relations. That policy evolved with the aggressive rise of American imperialism. It is even more in force today.

Given this background, it can be understood why the CIA finds the controlling group in the AFL-CIO bureaucracy so close to its heart.

## 3

## Partnership For Empire

The heads of the AFL had already tried a "partnership" with the top men of big business more than 15 years before the United States entered World War I. Significantly the National Civic Federation (NCF) came on the scene in 1900, immediately after the Spanish-American War.

The underlying concept of the NCF was collaboration between the top executives of the major corporations, few of which were then unionized, and the top AFL leadership together with some representatives of "the public," for the settlement of labor disputes. It was based on the threadbare idea that capital and labor have a common interest. This thesis has been heard thousands of times since the NCF was born and it wasn't new even then. What was new was the idea of establishing such collaboration as a national institution, with the blessings of corporate heads who wouldn't let union organizers come within shouting distance of their plant gates. It was clearly an attempt to seal a pact for peace at home between business and labor, as the former prepared for imperialist ventures abroad.

The understanding was not so easy to

reach. Gompers and John Mitchell of the miners, and the other labor men in the NCF, counted on the class collaboration plan to open the gates for unionization of the companies wishing industrial peace at home. But the association of the labor leaders with the NCF didn't advance unionism to the slightest degree. The bloody struggles of labor in the decades that followed hardly proved that the interests of labor and capital are common, although the labor "experts" never tired of the idea. But the NCF's concept of "partnerships" at the summit provided a pattern for the post-war twenties and after.

In later years the NCF remained little more than its president, Ralph Easley, and a list of endorsers from big business and some officials of labor. In the thirties Easley tried to revitalize the organization with a committee of prominent persons to present a favorable image of Hitler's "New Germany."

AFL vice-president Matthew Woll became the NCF's chief spokesman in its declining stages in the thirties. Apparently he still believed it could be revitalized. Woll was Gompers' closest collaborator and was most favored in the top bureaucracy to succeed him. Though he failed to get the presidency of the AFL, he continued as its chief formulator of policy until the 1955 merger. He was almost always chairman of the AFL's convention resolution committee. A lifelong Republican who even opposed Roosevelt and the New

Deal, Woll was in every sense the most articulate representative of United States imperialism in the federation's leadership.

As the AFL's international affairs chairman, Woll had an important hand in the development of "labor pan-Americanism," a fraternity with suitable labor leaders below the Rio Grande to complement U.S. attempts at making South America its exclusive domain. Every act of aggression by the United States during the era of "gun-boat diplomacy," the landing of marines in Cuba or military action against the liberation movement in Nicaragua in the twenties, had the blessing of this "labor pan-Americanism."

Woll was the most bitter opponent of the rising CIO in the mid-thirties. He stubbornly held that craft was the basis for unionism. It was Woll that John L. Lewis, founder of the CIO, saw as his chief antagonist in the AFL leadership; although shortly before U.S. involvement in World War II, both Woll and Lewis found themselves with Herbert Hoover in a committee to encourage Hitler to conquer the Soviet Union.

Woll's closest collaborator in fitting labor into an imperialist framework was David Dubinsky who in 1932 became president of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union. The alliance of the two came out of the intense struggle within the ILGWU between the reactionary officialdom and the left-led rank and file movement that con-

tinued through the twenties and early thirties. Woll was delegated by the AFL leadership to use the authority of the federation to prevent a left-led convention majority from forcing a change in the union's leadership.

It was Dubinsky's collaboration that brought Jay Lovestone into Woll's international affairs department. Dubinsky was the source of heavy finances for Woll's operations. In the late thirties and early forties he drew into his orbit many emigré Social-Democrats from Europe, including some leaders of the right-wing Socialist International. The expert anti-Communist advice of these emigrés was warmly appreciated in Woll's circle. He began to build a network of operatives long before there was a CIA. By World War II, Woll and Dubinsky, with Lovestone as their chief operational man and adviser, were the center of an assortment of exiles from many lands then under Nazi occupation. Financed mainly by the ILGWU, they plotted against the USSR while the war was still on. They discussed ways to influence a continuation of the war against the Soviet Union after the defeat of the Nazis, or, as some of them hoped, after a peace was negotiated with the fascist Axis.

They formed the American Labor Conference on International Affairs (ALCIA), through which they circularized unions with literature attacking the Soviet Union. In 1943, apparently alarmed because the Nazis

were beginning to meet defeat in the Soviet Union, they held a special conference in New York's Commodore Hotel. The featured address was by refugee Raphael Abramovitch, right-wing leader of the Socialist International, who had been plotting with Russian exiles in Europe for the overthrow of the Soviet Union since its inception. He told the conference that when the hot war ended, a new kind of war would develop against the USSR. His analysis undoubtedly reflected his hopes, but his prediction proved true. (In a letter to the 1950 convention of the ILGWU, Abramovitch congratulated Dubinsky "on the historic role you, together with President Green and Matthew Woll, played in shaping the foreign policy of American labor.")

ALCIA publishes the extreme red-baiting magazine *The New Leader* and the New Leader Paperback division. Always a recipient of substantial funds from the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, ALCIA has also been shown to receive grants from the J. M. Kaplan Fund, a CIA conduit. In 1962 ALCIA received \$7,500 and in 1964 \$5,000.

### *The CIO—The Target*

A major objective of ALCIA was to disrupt the CIO's support during the war for a solid anti-fascist labor front. A number of CIO leaders were drawn into its sponsoring com-

mittee. It played on the intense factionalism in the shipbuilding union and the effort of Walter Reuther to get right-wing support for his power struggle in the auto union. Emile Rieve, then president of the textile union, and Clinton Golden, a steel union vice-president, gave their names. But this disruptive work had little effect in the CIO during the war.

The rise of the CIO became a strong challenge to the imperialist line of the AFL in foreign affairs. The basic factor was that organization of millions of workers in the mass production industries, mostly unskilled or semiskilled, shifted the major base of organized labor from the crafts to industrial unionism. The dynamics of the labor movement came mainly from these newly organized, militant, Negro and white workers and the pressure of their long accumulated grievances. This shook the foundation on which Gompers, Woll and Green had built their collaboration with the men of the trusts and imperialism.

The CIO became identified with the Roosevelt policy. This led to the break with its founder, John L. Lewis, who joined the forces seeking a negotiated agreement with Hitler. Under Philip Murray's presidency, until the cold war was in full stride, the CIO supported a policy of US-USSR cooperation to defeat fascism and for a durable peace.

While the war was still on, the CIO entered into a friendship agreement with the Soviet trade unions. British and Soviet unions

joined the CIO as chief sponsors of the World Federation of Trade Unions, formed in 1945. The AFL refused to come in because Soviet labor was included. The CIO sent a delegation to the USSR in 1945, returning an earlier visit by Soviet trade unionists to the United States under CIO auspices. The delegation's report, published as CIO Pamphlet No. 128, had high praise for Soviet labor. Philip Murray, summarizing the CIO's international outlook of that time, wrote in a preface to the report: "I consider this document of first rate importance, not only for American labor but for all who are interested in knowing the truth about the Soviet trade union movement and promoting friendship and understanding between the peoples of our two countries. Unfortunately there are those who prefer to sow seeds of distrust and suspicion, who magnify the social and cultural differences into unbridgeable gulfs, and who seek to divide rather than to unite the world. It is my hope that this report will help prevent the division of the world into historic blocs and to prevent hostility against the great people whose cooperation was so essential to United Nations victory and whose continued friendship and cooperation is equally essential for a lasting peace and world prosperity."

CIO unionism also conflicted with the AFL's long-standing racial discrimination. The CIO opened its doors to the Negro workers on the production lines, and they

joined by the hundreds of thousands. This mass of organized Negro workers was a strong potential force against the Woll-Lovestone-Dubinsky pro-imperialist policy.

It was this potential anti-imperialist quality in the CIO, and the fact that its organizing drives were mainly directed at the most powerful American monopolies, that brought on the most savage attacks ever faced by trade unions. The CIO faced strike-breaking violence along the entire organizing front. At the same time, a congressional committee chaired by Martin Dies of Texas went after the CIO, using the techniques to be perfected by Joseph McCarthy more than a decade later. Fascist and ultra-rightist organizations formed to save America from the "new Soviet menace." A scurrilous pamphlet, called "Join the CIO and Build a Soviet America," received wide circulation.

On May 24, 1937, several weeks after the CIO's historic first contracts with General Motors and U.S. Steel were signed, the AFL called a special conference in Cincinnati to sound the alarm. The principal report was given by Joseph Frey, one of Woll's closest collaborators. His report essentially repeated the material of the Dies Committee (precursor of the present House Un-American Activities Committee) and J. Edgar Hoover's FBI files, picturing the CIO as a "rising Communist conspiracy." The conference voted a special per-capita assessment to finance the

war on the CIO. The next year, David Dubinsky took his ILGWU back into the AFL after a brief stay in the CIO.

National Guardsmen, the murder of strikers, the ultra-rightist and Dies Committee attacks did not halt the CIO's rise and its anti-imperialist trend. But a combination of internal and external factors did force a change in 1948. Internal anti-Communist factionalism, inspired mainly by the AFL, with strong State Department encouragement, cracked the CIO's unity. The CIA had just been established by President Truman. The Taft-Hartley law, barring certification of unions as bargaining agents if their leaders do not sign anti-Communist affidavits, took effect. The cold war, with its screenings, loyalty oaths and "security" measures, was under way. Former Vice-President Henry Wallace's candidacy for the presidency that year on a platform against the cold war, also sharpened division in labor's ranks.

The 1948 CIO convention in Portland, Oregon, was devoted to fitting the organization into the new cold war course, virtually assuring a split at the next convention. Supreme Court Justice William Douglas, the principal guest speaker, set the tone by picturing a "liberal" perspective attractive to some labor leaders. The world, said Douglas, sees the "American way of life as some form of unbridled, unregulated dog-eat-dog capitalism and they want none of it." He noted

widespread fear that a powerful America is an imperialism that "may be extending its power into Europe through cartels, banks and other powerful instruments of industry and finance."

"Out of this," he continued, "arises the importance of the fact that American labor carries good credentials to Western Europe. Doors tightly closed to all others may open at its knock. Words from American labor promise to find good acceptance. The conventional diplomat will fail miserably in these revolutionary days unless he understands the rise of the labor governments of the world and can evaluate the factors that have created and maintained them. . . . It is in this precise respect that American labor can render a unique service" (*Neither the Right Nor Left*, CIO pamphlet 165).

Listening to Douglas, many saw themselves named to ambassadorships and perhaps even to cabinet posts, because America needed them for a new image in the world. But they were to be disappointed. They were only wanted as labor attaches in the 16 Marshall Plan participant countries. By 1966 only one labor man, a retired AFL-CIO vice-president, served as ambassador—to Jamaica, for a short period.

At the 1949 CIO convention in Cleveland, 10 unions with a combined membership of 1,000,000 were expelled for holding to the CIO's earlier position against the cold war.

Before long, the Woll crowd and the CIO's leaders were cooperating to support the cold war and Korean war. Many complained that the CIO began to look like the old AFL. Bureaucratic domination of unions, ostensibly as a protection against Communism and against Taft-Hartley perils, was more widespread. Membership participation declined. The Southern organizing drive and others stopped. Finances and organizing manpower were dissipated in raids on the expelled unions. The number of Negroes at CIO conventions was reduced to a handful. Aside from foreign policy considerations, the injection of cold war issues into the unions was a most effective weapon to stop labor's advance.

The full story of the 1947-49 drive to bring the CIO into the cold-war fold has yet to be told.

In 1948 Arthur M. Goldberg, unknown but for his law office in the Chicago area, suddenly blossomed as the CIO's and the steel union's general counsel. Goldberg is generally described as a "labor man" because his very profitable business was mostly built up on legal work for unions. His labor image arises mainly from his reputation as the architect of the 1955 merger of the AFL and CIO. But considerable evidence indicates that Goldberg began his "architecture" for labor unity in the 1947-49 period, when he was the chief "architect" of the CIO split and the expulsion of the 10 "uncooperative" unions. He was

brought into prominence by those whose "unity formula" was to bring the CIO to the AFL position on world affairs, as the prerequisite to merger. That formula worked for a time, although after the merger the cracks began to open again on some questions. However, a major consequence was to put the merged labor movement's foreign affairs under men who are now charged with playing the CIA's game.

Coldberg's meteoric rise in government affairs matched the speed with which he became an "architect" in labor developments. Within three years, he became Secretary of Labor, then Supreme Court Justice and now U.S. Ambassador to the UN. It is his work in 1947-49 that was most valued in the White House and, it need hardly be added, in the chambers of the CIA.

## 4

### Labor Veterans at the Game

On March 13, 1951, George Meany boastfully reviewed what he called the federation's "world network in the fight against communism." Then secretary-treasurer of the AFL, Meany outlined the framework and scope of its intelligence activities (published as a pamphlet by the AFL, *The Last Five Years*, Washington, D.C., 1951).

The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions was already more than a year old when Meany made that speech. Although the AFL had a major role in splitting the World Federation of Trade Unions, and virtually controlled the newly-formed ICFTU, Meany stressed the AFL's own international operations. He boasted of the activities of the Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC), under the direction of Matthew Woll and Jay Lovestone, and the League for Human Rights that was then also a cover for their activities. Following the pattern of the U.S. Government's foreign "aid" policy, Meany described the AFL's aim as simply to "aid free trade unionists" throughout the world. The only requirement to meet the AFL's "aid" test was evidence that the recipient "fought Communism," said Meany.

He tried to impress his listeners with the AFL's spirit of "internationalism." But the truth is that throughout the Gompers period, the AFL would not affiliate with the pre-war International Federation of Trade Unions because its reform Socialist leaders were too radical for it. This remained the case through William Green's presidency, except for the brief wartime period when the AFL affiliated with the IFTU only to weight the vote against admission of Soviet trade unions. In 1945, when the IFTU affiliates joined the CIO and the Soviet trade unions in the formation of the WFTU, the AFL leaders pulled out and chose isolation from the world's labor movement.

Meany boasted of the literature the AFL's own "International" was issuing in several languages, stressing its value only as a weapon against "Communism." Of the many delegations the AFL invited for tours of the United States, Meany said, "we have found in these delegations sources of invaluable strength and effectiveness in our great struggle against the common enemy—the menace of Communism."

Meany noted the numerous AFL's representatives abroad—Henry Rutz in Germany, Richard Deverall in Japan for the Far East, Serafino Ramualdi in charge of Latin American operations, Irving Brown as "European representative," a "bureau" in India, etc. He

boasted of bi-lateral relationships with various unions throughout the world.

But there are still unanswered questions: Why the separate network of agents? Isn't the ICFTU supposed to be the AFL-CIO's expression for international relations? Why can only Americans be entrusted with those tasks that Meany considers so important? Is it because the State Department and the CIA want only their hand-picked operatives in various parts of the world, taking instructions from an *American* headquarters?

Meany's attitude on internationalism was shown on one occasion, in December 1951, when he returned from a conference and inspection tour in Europe. In an angry mood he told the *New York Times*: "The governments, the unions and everybody else seem to be willing to let us be concerned and they do nothing about it. . . . There is no real cooperation in Europe on the issue of Communist unions. . . . You are given the feeling that only Americans are worried about Communism."

In later years, Meany and his associates became concerned over the increasing talk of peaceful coexistence and the series of summit conferences that were taking place. William Schnitzler, secretary-treasurer of the AFL, addressing the British Trade Union Congress as fraternal delegate in October 1956, complained: "The European fight against Com-

munism has been moving downhill ever since the summit talks between President Eisenhower and the Russians two years ago."

The *Federationist*, formerly the monthly magazine of the AFL and now of the AFL-CIO, has run volumes of copy on international affairs, including frequent reviews by field men of developments in their respective areas. But not an article on foreign relations will be found that isn't concerned solely with the "war against Communism." There is no reference to any of the social and economic problems, e.g., the menace of international monopolies, that are common to workers of the whole world.

### "Internationalism" for Intelligence

How much difference is there between Meany's concept of "internationalism" and the CIA's network for espionage and paramilitary activity against Communism?

AFL leaders (and on occasion CIO leaders) made no secret of the nature of the work they wanted done in "international relations." William Green's editorials in the *Federationist* during the Korea war revealed the thinking of these people. In the April 1950 issue, for example, Green wrote, "All organized groups of democratic citizens in this and other countries should band together to get aid to the underground forces courageously fighting the cause of democracy for

us. . . . We have many citizens who are familiar with foreign countries and can serve our nation . . . by helping to organize and maintain resistance in the nations seized by Stalin. These resistance groups would provide the best possible intelligence source to guide all our efforts in the cold war. This is one contribution all groups and exiles can make. . . ."

An assortment of exile groups in the United States, refugees from socialist countries, were trying to do precisely what Green called for.

A month earlier, Green editorialized against an alleged Communist threat to "wipe out human freedom and our Christian civilization in which freedom has its roots." He denounced the socialist regimes for "repudiation of the teachings of the Christian religion," in the familiar language of the ultra-rightists and anti-Semites.

The same issue of the *Federationist* contained a greeting from Green to the "Free China Labor League," a CIA operation in Taiwan (Formosa) set up with the cooperation of Chiang Kai-shek. Green claimed that the League has a million members in the "underground unions of the mainland." In his previously-cited Chicago speech a year later, Meany said that the AFL is "linked" to the Taiwan organization, and "we are aiding the underground democratic forces."

In the May 1950 *Federationist*, Green de-

clared that "our security is imperiled if American policy is administered by Communists or Communist sympathizers." Truman, hardly "soft on Communism," was then President.

Green's editorial of July 1951 applauded the Supreme Court's ruling upholding the Smith Act and the jailing of the 11 top Communist Party leaders.

Communists, Communist sympathizers and non-Communists on the left were pictured as "foreign agents," "conspirators," and as a "secret underground," in order to justify the "counter-intelligence" and paramilitary activity the CIA was beginning to develop.

The first law of intelligence operations is not to admit to anything, but on occasion the operatives are caught. In November 1946, *Hoy*, then the paper of the Cuban Confederation of Labor (CTC), ran photostats of two letters. One, dated June 27, 1946, was from Matthew Woll to Juan Arevalo, head of the Cuban Maritime Union. The letter, on AFL stationery, said: "I was delighted to receive your letter and report of your meeting with [Serafino] Ramualdi and of developments having taken place in Haiti. I will be pleased to hear later from you regarding the interview with the captain of the Military Intelligence Service and likewise your visit to Port au Prince and to British Jamaica where you intend visiting Bustamente. I will also await

further word from you regarding the Dominican Republic."

The letter went on to discuss arrangements for a conference in Montreal later that year and suggested that Latin American delegates meet beforehand in Washington or New York with him. Woll continued, "I am delighted to know that Francesco Aguire of Cuba was elected to the Congress by the votes of free labor. I note, too, that he will be your candidate as secretary general of the CTC at the next Congress in December. I presume we will be able to discuss this development and possibly at the meeting to take place here or in Washington. Certainly this development is most encouraging and of utmost importance. We do want to be certain that whatever procedure is followed has every prospect of unquestioned success."

The other letter was from Arevalo to Bernardo Ibanez, then Woll's agent in Chile. The subject of that letter was the splitting of unions in Chile and other Latin American countries that these champions of "free unionism" were conspiring to bring about. Disruptive activities spread against unions in Latin America, followed by bloody strikebreaking and a planned campaign to assassinate "anti-Yankee" labor leaders. Some of Cuba's outstanding labor leaders were assassinated in that period and a plot to kill Lazaro Pena, the head of the CTC, was uncovered.

Such was the "international solidarity" and "free unionism" that Woll and Jay Lovestone promoted through the FTUC. Shortly after the exposure of Woll's letter to Arevalo, *Collier's* magazine published an article (November 8, 1947) by Sigrid Schultz, a broadcaster and correspondent in Berlin for many years. She described how the Hitlerites in post-war West Germany were dreaming of another war: "Pronouncements by the vice-president of the American Federation of Labor, Matthew Woll, play an important role in the 'get ready for war campaign.' Hundreds of thousands of organized workers in the Ruhr and in Western Germany have been flooded with photostatic copies of Woll's editorials in the International Free Trade Union News. The Germans take Woll's statements to mean that 'Germany must rearm for the coming war against Communism.' Why bother with peace problems if the Big Brother from America says the war is coming?"\*

The New York *Daily News* wrote on March 15, 1953, datelined Berlin: "The American Federation of Labor is sponsoring a spy organization in Berlin, it was disclosed here today. The AFL transmits approximately

\* In recent years, AFL (and now AFL-CIO) policy supported German rearmament with even greater vigor. Former Chancellor Konrad Adenauer expressed appreciation for this service by conferring on Meany and Lovestone West Germany's highest civilian awards (*AFL-CIO News*, Dec. 19, 1959).

\$10,000 a month to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, which in turn, passes the money to the group called Kampfgruppe (combat group)." The story added that the group claims to have contacts behind the "iron curtain" and has "a top secret spy section whose operations are known only to U.S. Intelligence."

Another leak in the labor intelligence system came with the publication in full of the proceedings of the National Maritime Union's executive board in February 1954 (*NMU Pilot*, February 1954). Hulbert B. Warner, the Negro vice-president of the union, was opposed in a bid for re-election by a candidate of the administration of Joseph Curran. Warner told of the way administration campaigners approached people in the union with the line that "niggers are taking over the union and the big ships are being run by niggers," and that "new members are all niggers."

He said that Hoyt Haddock, NMU representative in Washington, came to New York to see him. "You know I am close to the Pentagon," Haddock began, according to Warner. "Army intelligence called me in and told me that there was a move in the union to take over, that the Negroes were given preference and the Puerto Ricans, and there is an agent in the union and their finger pointed at you. Well, other government agencies are interested, too."

Then Haddock told him how "promptly behind came the Navy intelligence with the same story, . . . behind them came the Coast Guard Intelligence with the same story, only the FBI went further. The FBI said (to Haddock) 'you'll go to New York and bring us back information concerning this matter.' Here I am. I want to know the percentage of these persons being taken into the union."

Warner argued with Haddock that his estimate would only be a guess, but Haddock took out a pencil and pad and said, "It's OK, let's try that."

"So I knew I was speaking to the FBI, to the Navy, the Coast Guard and the Army," said Warner.

Warner was previously elected on an "anti-Communist" ticket. But evidently he didn't understand anti-Communism to mean that he had to collaborate with intelligence and racism. "It is this sort of thing," he said, "which makes you sick inside and makes you feel you are up to your knees in filth and you can't live with it because these are not trade union people . . . they are corrupt diseased characters . . . they have no morals."

By 1954 the NMU had fully conformed to the cold war. Anyone who had even remote associations with the former left-wing leaders of the union was expelled or screened out of the industry by the Coast Guard. Negroes and Puerto Ricans were then still regarded as "security risks."

## 5

## How the Conspiracy Developed

Jay Lovestone, who has been described as very influential in US policy making and in the framing of the AFL-CIO's foreign policy, is invariably referred to as a "former Communist." In 1929 he was expelled after a long struggle within the Communist Party. Lovestone and those expelled with him took the position that American capitalism was of an "exceptional" and all-powerful nature, one to which Marxist analysis was not applicable, and that the prosperity of the twenties would last a long time. The expulsions were hardly carried out when the big crash of 1929 came. Before long, Lovestone and others ousted with him became professional anti-Communists.\*

With the rapid radicalization of the workers during the stormy thirties, the market

\*In addition to Lovestone, who long maintained a New York office with files of information for anti-Communist specialists, the group included Bert Miller (Mandel), who became the "red" expert for the Eastland Committee of the Senate; Bertram Wolfe, who made his living as an "ideologist" against Marxism; and Benjamin Gitlow, who became a professional anti-Communist witness and authored a book titled *I Confess* that was marketed during the McCarthy period.

improved for Lovestone. The fear of Left influence grew among employers and certain labor leaders. There was a demand for people who knew the Left and how to fight it effectively. ILGWU president David Dubinsky, facing a strong Left-led rank and file movement in the garment industry, decided to hire Lovestone. Before long Lovestone was secretary of the ILGWU's international affairs committee. A marriage was consummated that was to have a very important influence in the labor movement for the next three decades.

Lovestone, with the help of Dubinsky, moved into the United Automobile Workers in 1937 to try to build a base. He became an advisor to UAW president Homer Martin at a moment when the union's rank and file was up in arms against Martin. His effort failed and Martin was later exposed as a Ford agent. (Walter Gallenson, *The CIO Challenge to the AFL*, Harvard University Press, 1960, pp. 151-162.)

A hunger for revenge seems to have been the sole motivating force in Lovestone for the 37 years since his expulsion from the Communist Party. His dream was once developed in an entire issue of *Collier's* magazine (Oct. 27, 1951) that fancifully gave a preview of "Russia's Defeat and Occupation, 1952-1960." A number of prominent writers and personalities, including Walter Reuther, told with science-fiction imagination and ap-

propriate drawings of how the USSR was "conquered" by fire and the Soviet people "liberated." Fifteen years have passed since *Collier's* contribution to the McCarthyite lunacy, but Lovestone remains entrusted with AFL-CIO foreign policy. The men who pay him still believe that they need an "expert" on Communism to fight the Communists.

### *How They Teamed Up*

With the ILGWU his base and its tremendous treasury at his command, Dubinsky built a powerful machine with the right-wing Socialists who, like himself, left the Socialist Party in the late thirties. His network expanded considerably as more right-wing Socialists came to the United States when Hitler occupied Europe. Dubinsky financed an assortment of exile groups from various countries whose leaders were in demand in Washington on intelligence matters affecting their homelands. They held themselves in readiness for important government posts should the Nazis be driven out of their native countries, or if the West should be strong enough to set up regimes in Eastern Europe. However, history was very harsh to these people. Their bitterness transformed itself into a rabid anti-Communism which perfectly suited the newly-established CIA.

In 1940 Dubinsky played a major role in elevating George Meany from the New York

State AFL presidency to the post of national secretary-treasurer. The two men came from different backgrounds, Meany from the very conservative building trades, Dubinsky from the garment workers with progressive and socialist traditions. While Dubinsky was once a strong influence in the American Labor Party and, later, in the Liberal Party, Meany has always opposed a third party. Even right-wing Socialists, like those who have long surrounded Dubinsky, are repulsive to Meany as shown by his endless quarrels with them in the ICFTU.

Whether or not Meany had a clear perspective of his course in 1940, Dubinsky certainly had. The combination of Dubinsky's strength with the building trades and Woll's backers was enough to insure for Meany the support he needed. The building trades leaders, then very fearful of the rise of industrial unions, were most anxious to get their man in top office. William Green, in his seventies, was not considered strong enough to wage the kind of struggle against the new unionism that they wanted. On its part, Dubinsky's group was most anxious for a coalition that would solidly support a policy of international anti-Communism. That Meany knew nothing of world affairs made him all the more desirable. Lester Velie, in *Labor USA* (New York 1958)—a "public relations" book for Meany, Dubinsky and Lovestone—writes that when Meany stepped into

the secretary-treasurer post in 1940, he had little to occupy his time, but "with the encouragement of his friend David Dubinsky . . . he turned to international affairs." To make him an "authority" in the field, Lovestone was assigned to be what is described as Meany's "intellectual valet." Lovestone, wrote Velie, "digs up ammunition for the policy decisions."

Velie observed that "Lovestone is listened to in the State Department" and would periodically "canvass the world Communist situation in a talk with the then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (brother of Allen Dulles)." Velie writes that when the Free Trade Union Committee was formed in 1944 at a meeting of Woll, Meany and Dubinsky, it was at the latter's suggestion that Lovestone was named secretary. Lovestone's link to the CIA was even more bluntly put, and never denied, by the Knight newspaper chain columnist Edwin A. Lahey in the *Chicago Daily News*, August 20, 1955 (see George Morris, *American Labor, Which Way*, New York, 1961).

Although the CIO's international policy had already deteriorated substantially by 1955, in the merger talks with the AFL its representatives, headed by Walter Reuther, still insisted that Lovestone must be removed from international affairs leadership. Meany agreed to a compromise that reduced Lovestone to what appeared to be an unimportant

post in charge of literature, but he remained Meany's advisor and actually had the real power on international affairs. After several sharp disputes\* in the AFL-CIO's Executive Council over this violation of the compromise agreement, Meany agreed to place Michael Ross, former CIO director of international affairs, in the same post for the AFL-CIO. Shortly before his death Ross told me that it was not he but actually Lovestone and Meany who were running the department. In 1964 Meany made it formal by naming Lovestone director.

### *Changing Faces*

Recently there has been a noticeable change of personnel in the AFL-CIO's international department. Serafino Ramualdi was replaced by Andrew McLellan as Lovestone's man in Latin America. Not much is heard any more of Richard Deverall who had operated out of Tokyo since World War II. Harry Goldberg, in Indonesia until he was deported, has been confined to the home office to write reports. Henry Rutz, in West Germany, is no longer heard from. Irving Brown, who was roving ambassador in Eu-

\* One outcome of Meany's infatuation with Lovestone was the resignation, soon after the merger, of Jacob Potofsky, president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, from the co-chairmanship with Woll of the International Affairs Committee.

rope and Asia, now heads the ICFTU's office at the UN and an "African-American Labor Center" in New York. A number of Negroes on Africa projects, like Maida Springer of the ILGWU, seem to have departed from the field. Among the new faces is Ernest Lee, Meany's son-in-law, who is Lovestone's assistant and possible replacement some day.

AFL-CIO international policy has become so discredited throughout the world that the changes are understandable. For example, Deverall has been kicked out of so many areas in the Far East that he lost his usefulness. The plan to build up Japan's labor movement as the major reactionary base in the Far East failed completely. Japan's main federation of labor, SOHYO, is a center for militancy. It has a fraternal relationship with the WFTU. In the March 1956 *Federationist*, Deverall was very hopeful because General MacArthur, while ruling over Japan, "purged 12,000 alleged Communist union leaders." He wrote, "Today in many Asian countries the American embassy has both a labor attache and a labor information officer. These men, on a governmental and official level, observe and report on the progress of labor in the countries to which they have been assigned and—when asked—inform Asian trade unions about American trade union procedures."

Europe has undergone a big change since the days immediately after the war, when

AFL and CIO dollars for "deserving" unions talked louder than their policy. Today there is a growing cleavage between the U.S. unions and most of Europe's unions. In addition to widening foreign policy differences, continuing Meany-Lovestone arrogance and periodic threats to withdraw funds from the ICFTU if its anti-Communism doesn't improve, only invite anger. European unions view AFL-CIO representatives in Europe as an affront to their own independence and dignity.

Behind this loss of prestige for U.S. labor leadership in the world, has been almost two decades of attempted or successful overthrows of governments and assorted paramilitary operations under CIA direction or influence, with staunch AFL-CIO cooperation.

Published documentation of CIA involvement in the unions, like the Washington *Post* series by Dan Kurzman (Dec. 30, 1965-Jan. 2, 1966), is a reflection of the sharp division in the labor leadership over foreign policy. Newsmen do not obtain such material out of thin air.\*

Kurzman does not name his informants, but obviously they come from the ranks of

\* Equally significant is the fact that long-established voices of liberalism in the United States, like *The Nation* and *New Republic*, find it fitting to run extensive surveys on the subject. See Sidney Lens, "Lovestone Diplomacy," *The Nation*, July 5, 1965; Dan Kurzman, "Lovestone's Cold War—The AFL-CIO Has its Own C.I.A.," *New Republic*, June 25, 1966.

critics like the Reuthers. Such sources told him that Meany's power in the federation's foreign affairs "is virtually sovereign," and that "he almost invariably listens to Lovestone in determining how to use his power." Lovestone's advice is "crucial in shaping the private foreign policy of the AFL-CIO."

Lovestone is held responsible for the boycott by the International Longshoremen's Association of vessels serving Cuban ports, and in influencing the policy of U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic. He "runs a vast intelligence system," Kurzman adds, "that appears to be informally but tightly integrated with the Central Intelligence Agency." Informants said Lovestone's guiding thought is that the world is made up of Communists and anti-Communists, and they "must inevitably clash in a great final battle." Lovestone's critics were afraid to talk for fear of losing their jobs as being "soft on Communism." One source told Kurzman, "If Jay finds out I have spoken to you my career is dead."

As one of this country's "principal repositories of cold war intelligence information," Kurzman continues, Lovestone appears to have an efficient intelligence system for keeping track of State Department labor attaches and labor information officers scattered in every country. State Department selections "must always get Lovestone's stamp of approval." Many are required to keep in con-

stant contact with him after they take their assignments. A complaint often heard is that if any attaches are "mistrusted by Lovestone, an assistant attache is often around to report on his activities." One such attache to a South American country said he was afraid to meet with certain "anti-American and Leftist elements" for fear Lovestone would find out. Another AFL-CIO staffman, who visited Yugoslavia during a European vacation trip, applied for an attache assignment, and had to go to Lovestone for questioning on his political views.

Kurzman was also told that the world-wide knowledge "that Lovestone maintains close ties with the Central Intelligence Agency" has become a source of concern for union leaders in Europe and other parts of the world. This has contributed to the friction between U.S. labor leaders and labor abroad within the ICFTU.\*

Many of the AFL-CIO's foreign activities, according to Victor Reuther in his interview, (Detroit *Free Press*, May 23, 1966), were conducted by Lovestone without even a report to the AFL-CIO Executive Council. He noted that the AFL-CIO annually spends \$6 million in Latin America and that much of this money comes from other than AFL-CIO sources. This implies something far more seri-

\* The *New York Times* (Feb. 21, 1967) said, "Reports of close relations between Lovestone, Mr. (Irving) Brown and the CIA go back to 1952."

ous than may appear at first glance. The entire AFL-CIO income was \$10,636,388 in 1964 and \$10,825,483 in 1965, according to its report to the San Francisco convention (*Proceedings, AFL-CIO Convention, 1965*). In both years, just over \$2 million went into the "special purposes" fund, almost all of which is used for the federation's international affairs. Obviously, the bulk of the \$6 million spent annually in Latin America alone comes from other sources.\* Reuther's charge indicates that the "extra" expenditures may be accounted for by CIA or some other government agency. If an accounting of such vast unauthorized expenditures cannot be given, obviously neither can anything be reported about the projects for which the funds are spent or the persons engaged in those activities; still less can official reports on such activities to the Executive Council be expected. The CIA and its fronts do not need the AFL-CIO's money. They only want its credentials, and men in the field who can parade as "representatives of labor."

\* See "Epilogue," pp. 149ff.

## Marching Along with CIA

The CIA's first major experiment in paramilitarism came in June 1954. After a period of missionary work, an army equipped by the CIA in Honduras and headed by a Colonel Carlos Castillo-Armas, marched into Guatemala and, after about two weeks of fighting, overthrew the government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman.\* American imperialism had been against the popular-based Arbenz government, which had taken serious steps to make land available for the first time to large numbers of peasants. Unions were given full rights and encouraged to organize large firms like the United Fruit Company. A drive was launched to eliminate illiteracy and to develop democratic participation in government. Foreign firms lost many privileges.

The Arbenz government was by no stretch of the imagination "Communist," as Washington claimed, but it was the closest thing to a popular regime Latin America had in 1954. The CIA, with the "full advance approval" of the White House, felt it necessary to overthrow Arbenz before he set an example for his Latin neighbors.

\* This operation was well described and documented by Wise and Ross in *Invisible Government*.

Months in advance of the invasion, the AFL, and to some extent the CIO, echoed the attacks upon the Arbenz government as "Communist-dominated," Ramualdi giving the signals. The AFL Council directed Meany in February 1954 (four months prior to the invasion) to send a letter to Arbenz, disclosing its contents publicly for propaganda purposes. American "labor" is very much "concerned" over the state of affairs in Guatemala, wrote Meany. "We are anxious that this concern not give rise to any developments which might be damaging to the best interests of your country." He suggested that to avoid this "damaging" possibility, Arbenz must stop attacks on United States imperialism in Guatemala's press, purge the unions of what Meany called "Communists," and stop giving support to "bogus peace campaigns, Communist 'youth' congresses, 'cultural' gatherings and other Communist front organizations" (*American Federationist*, February 1954). The purpose of the letter was to put on public record that "labor" is against the Arbenz government (a helpful cover to CIA operations), and to advise the Guatemalans how to avoid "damage."

The next month in the *Federationist* (March), Meany attacked Latin American governments for opposing intervention in Guatemala, and approvingly took note that "our government has announced its intention

to lay the cards on the table and come to a showdown."

Three months after the *coup*, Ramualdi joyously reported (*The Federationist*, September 1954) the great triumph and boasted of the role of the AFL and its friends in the operation. Ramualdi told how he, Daniel Benedict of the CIO and Raul Valdivia of the then pro-Batista Cuban Federation of Labor, rushed to Guatemala to help fit the "freed" workers into the new scheme of things. He wrote of the noble intentions of "liberator" Castillo-Armas, found the people "solidly" behind him, and reported that the colonel gave "definite assurances" that trade union rights would be preserved and no backward steps taken. On his return to the United States that month, Ramualdi learned that Castillo-Armas had dissolved the country's major unions. This, however, did not deter the AFL from issuing a statement that it "rejoices over the downfall" of the Arbenz regime.

Two years later, Ramualdi conceded that Castillo-Armas had instituted a complete dictatorship with hardly a semblance of union rights left. The peasants lost the land they had received, United Fruit had its "rights" restored, and large numbers who were active in the overthrown government were now in prison, exiled, underground, or dead. To the CIA this was a successful operation, a big boost for its prospects.

The leadership of labor was not unanimous on Guatemala. Daniel Benedict of the CIO returned two weeks after Castillo-Armas took over, and told a story entirely different from Ramualdi's. He reported that the 5,000 to 8,000 persons jailed were mostly unionists and that even the "non-Communist" unions were smashed. Benedict's report was followed by a CIO protest to the State Department. Shortly after the overthrow, Emil Mazey, secretary-treasurer of the United Automobile Workers, spoke out sharply in a speech before the Michigan CIO Convention: "In Guatemala we have made exactly the same blunders that we have made in Indochina and elsewhere. There again we have been supporting the wrong people. . . . I blame the State Department. I blame the United Fruit Co. for the difficulties that we have in Guatemala at the present time and because the State Department and the United Fruit Co. have been manipulating the politics of that country. They have organized revolutions in the past against the best interests of the people. They have opposed land reform. They have opposed any special progress for the people of Guatemala and then we wonder why the Communists who make promises of land reform, who make promises of social security and other necessary gains for the people, wind up on top. I say we have to change this foreign policy of ours. We have got to stop measuring our foreign

policy on what's good for American business that has money invested in South America and elsewhere in the world."

### *Friends of Batista*

The events related to the Cuban revolution and the disastrous CIA Bay of Pigs invasion turned out differently than the Guatemala experience. But that was not for want of support from the AFL-CIO leadership. Its international policies sought to undermine the new revolutionary regime from its very start in January 1959. In the beginning there was some hope that the old contacts in the leadership of the Cuban Federation of Labor could be used for internal subversion. Before a year was up, however, Ramuvaldi had to report that a convention had removed all his friends from leadership. Before long the ousted general secretary, Eusebio Mujal, and the entire officialdom, who had backed overthrown dictator Batista, were in Miami.

Dan Kurzman wrote in the *New Republic* (June 25, 1966): "Not surprisingly, former CTC leaders who had worked with Batista—and are suspect of having C.I.A. connections—were soon attached to the organizations backed by the AFL-CIO: Eusebio Mujal as head of the Central Cuban Workers in Exile in Mexico; Jose Artigas Carbonel, former CTC treasurer, as representative of AIFLD in Central America, and Estaban Rustan,

former secretary-general of the Confederation of Bank Employes, as ORIT man in Costa Rica."

In 1947, the year the CIA was born, Ramuvaldi's men from all parts of Latin America came to a conference in Lima, Peru, to form the Inter-American Confederation of Workers (CIT). They set as their main objective smashing the Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL), headed by Vicente Lombardo Toledano of Mexico. Significantly Mujal of Cuba was named Secretary of the CIT, and Bernardo Ibanez of Chile (recall the aforementioned letter of June 1946, urging him to step up trade union splits in South America) was named chairman, with Meany a vice-chairman. The CIT served for a period as the center from which the CIA could extend contacts to labor organizations in Latin America. Throughout the period of Batista's most reactionary rule and service to U.S. policy, the clique that ran the Cuban labor federation had an important role in the Meany-Woll-Lovestone operations. Havana was a major center for their activities. The Cuban revolution was therefore a serious blow to this group, both organizationally and politically.

Following the success of the Cuban government under Fidel Castro, Thomas Gleason, president of the International Longshoremen's Association, Paul Hall, president of the Seafarers International Union, and Jo-

seph Curran of the NMU announced that any ship of any country touching a Cuban port would not be serviced in an American port. This announcement appeared to be their own and, on the public record, not solicited by the government.

Their boycott continued notwithstanding appeals by the State Department to Meany that he do something to stop this "setting of foreign policy" by a union. The boycott was embarrassing to the government because it involved other countries, including Britain, that determined their own policies on such matters. Meany did not show interest in stopping the boycott. While the U.S. government pretended to be disturbed by this "initiative" of union leaders, not a cross word was directed at Gleason, Hall or Curran. This had all the indications of an "invisible" force doing what the official hand could not.

#### *U-2 Plus an AFL-CIO Conference*

The flight of Gary Powers in a U-2 spy plane shot down over Soviet territory a few days before the summit conference scheduled for Paris on May 16, 1960, was another event in which the CIA shocked the world. The U-2 is a CIA plane, built by Lockheed, and equipped to take photos from great heights. Disregarding all international law, the CIA flies over any territory it chooses. The delib-

erate flying of the plane deep into the Soviet Union just as heads of state of the big powers were to meet blew up the summit conference. President Eisenhower sanctioned the U-2 flights, although there is some question whether he knew of the flight on the eve of the conference. There were strong forces in the United States who did not want summit talks because they did not want peace. Wise and Ross say in their book that CIA officials were fearful lest one of the results of the summit discussions would be a ban on unauthorized plane flights. The double effect of disrupting the summit conference and avoiding an agreement banning U-2 flights, was welcomed by those opposing a reduction of world tensions.

The AFL-CIO's International Affairs Department arranged an "AFL-CIO Conference on World Affairs" at the Commodore Hotel in New York for April 19-20, 1960—four weeks before the scheduled Paris conference—with a long list of speakers known for views acceptable to Meany. Moreover, the AFL-CIO purchased a very expensive 16-page magazine insert in a Sunday *New York Times* preceding the Paris meeting, summarizing the conference speeches. The arrangement seemed deliberately timed to give the world an impression that "American labor" was cold to the summit talks. There is no evidence of collusion with the CIA, but once

again their sentiments coincided, and both welcomed the blowup of the Paris summit meeting.

### *The Guyana Operation*

British Guiana,\* on the Caribbean coast of South America, was another locale of CIA paramilitarism. The colony had been allowed the right to elect its own parliament, but in 1953 when the liberation movement led by Cheddi Jagan won an election in majority, the British sailed a warship into Georgetown, the capital, lifted constitutional rights and jailed Prime Minister Jagan. Elections in 1957 and 1961 returned Jagan's Peoples Progressive Party to office until 1965.

The idea of independence for British Guiana under Jagan's premiership horrified Washington, which saw it as another Cuba (although the CIA was working in British Guiana long before the Cuban revolution). The country's population is primarily composed of people of Indian origin and Negroes. Jagan's popular base, mostly Indian, was in the rural areas, while Forbes Burnham's opposed of people of Indian origin and Negroes in the cities.

The tactics of the "invisible" invaders were to foster racial strife, aim for a base in

\* In May 1966, the colony acquired independence, renaming itself Guyana.

the Trade Union Congress and to paint Jagan "red." In the July 1957 *Federationist*, Harry H. Pollack, identified as "associate inter-American representative," reported on his observations and operations in British Guiana. He labeled Jagan a "Stalinite" and called for "strong international trade union solidarity" to free the colony's workers from "Stalinism," not from British rule.

After years of attacks on the Jagan government, the showdown came in 1964. Experts trained in fomenting racial strife and riots came into the country in large numbers, usually under the guise of labor representatives. An anti-government strike spread killings to many parts of the country. Government records showed more visitors to that tiny country in the name of "labor solidarity" in 18 months than in the previous 18 years. Jagan disclosed the names of 11 Guyanese graduates of the AFL-CIO's American Institute of Free Labor Development (AIFLD) in Washington, who were back in the country and in the midst of the anti-government strife. In the United States, the AFL-CIO protested that Jagan refused to admit Gene Meakins, a former vice-president of the American Newspaper Guild, who sought entrance to assist the anti-government force in "public relations." The *Guild Reporter* said the exclusion of Meakins was an act against "free unionism." The AFL-CIO's unusually large

finances for this operation were only a token of the huge sums that came in the name of "labor solidarity" from invisible sources.

The CIA's role was an open secret. Referring to the wave of riots organized against the Jagan government as a "strike," Drew Pearson, wrote in his syndicated column published on March 22, 1964 (Quoted in *Minority of One*, Sept., 1966):

"The strike was secretly inspired by a combination of U.S. Central Intelligence Agency money and British Intelligence. It gave London the excuse it wanted. British Guiana had not yet received its independence and another Communist government at the bottom of the one-time American lake has been temporarily stopped."

The *New York Times* in its series of articles on the CIA's activities, said (April 28, 1966) that the CIA "has poured money into Latin American campaigns in support of moderate candidates and against leftist leaders such as Cheddi Jagan of British Guiana."

The postponement of independence gave the CIA time to pressure successfully for a change of election laws. When the election took place in 1965, although the Jagan government received its highest vote, the opposition headed by Burnham, together with a reactionary third balance-of-power party, was able to muster a narrow majority of seats and form the government. That, of course, made the country "mature" for independence.

Steps for U.S. penetration followed in quick order. The American Institute for Free Labor Development, with George Meany taking a personal hand, signed an agreement to sponsor a housing project with loans from U.S. union treasuries. The AIFLD also signed an agreement with the Burnham government for the establishment of an industrial training center to be financed by the Institute to the tune of \$486,800.

### *The Latin America Story*

The Inter-American Regional Organization (ORIT), the ICFTU's regional body in the Western hemisphere, is now handled by Andrew McLellan, who replaced Ramualdi. Notwithstanding ORIT's concentration of personnel and dollars, Latin America is by no means the exclusive domain of the AFL-CIO. The WFTU has considerable following even in some ORIT affiliates. In Argentina, the Peronists are the major influence. The International Confederation of Christian Trade Unions has many affiliates and considerable influence through the Latin American Confederation of Christian Unions (CLASC). All three groups are hostile to the leadership of ORIT, charging it with being a tool of "yankee imperialism," and of supporting reactionary dictatorships.

In 1962, Lovestone set up the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD),

with William C. Doherty, Jr. in charge. AIFLD trains Latin Americans for "union leadership" through a school in Washington and a network of classes in Latin American countries. It also extends U.S. government-backed loans from union welfare funds and other sources to Latin American unions for social welfare and housing projects.

AIFLD is a "tri-partite" project. It consists of U.S. labor leaders, some 65 U.S. corporations with heavy investments in Latin America, and the U.S. government, through the Alliance for Progress. Meany is president of AIFLD and the chairman of its board is J. Peter Grace who heads W. R. Grace & Co., a big chain of corporations and banking interests. Brent Friele, representing Rockefeller interests in South America, is vice-chairman of the board. The trustees of AIFLD include Juan Trippe, president of Pan-American World Airways; Charles Brinkerhoff, president of Anaconda Copper; William M. Hickey of the United Corporation and Robert C. Hill of Merck & Co.

J. Peter Grace is perhaps most representative of the "working class spirit" of AIFLD. Besides being president of W. R. Grace & Co., he is a director of the National City Bank of New York, director of Grace Line, Inc., and director of Stone & Webster, one of the country's top builders. He is also a member of the Colombian Chamber of Commerce, president of Brazilian Technical, Inc.,

and treasurer of Aid Refugee Chinese Intellectuals, Inc.

The director of AIFLD's school, until his retirement in 1966, was Serafino Ramualdi. Before coming into the ranks of "labor" Ramualdi had been counsel on labor to the Coordinating Committee on Latin American Affairs, headed by Nelson Rockefeller.

The bulk of the annual cost of AIFLD is borne by the U.S. government from Administration for International Development (AID) funds. In 1965 more than \$3,000,000 came from AID, \$200,500 from the AFL-CIO's treasury and some \$150,000 from the corporations (*Business Week*, August 27, 1966).

Scholarship applicants for the three-month course in Washington must go through rigid screening for anti-Communism. AIFLD pays the student's travel expenses, his upkeep in Washington, and his family at home. The student is kept on the payroll at home for nine months after graduation provided he shows in action that he "deserves" such generosity.

The AFL-CIO press and AIFLD's promotional literature note how returning students took part in the overthrow of the Goulart government in Brazil. Students are singled out for claims of eliminating "Communists" from certain unions. The eleven students from British Guiana were apparently so essential in the drive against Cheddi Jagan

that they were kept on the payroll beyond the nine-month post-graduate period.

Doherty stated that the crop of Brazilian graduates from AIFLD's courses sent back in 1964 "were so active that they became intimately involved in some of the clandestine operations of the revolution before it took place. . . . Many of the trade union leaders—some of whom were actually trained in our institute—were involved in the revolution, and the overthrow of the Goulart regime." (Quoted by Sidney Lens in the *Nation*, July 5, 1965.) More recently, March 6, 1966, over the AFL-CIO's weekly broadcasts on the Mutual Network, Doherty continued to boast of the results achieved in Brazil. Asked by a newsman how he squared Brazil's dictatorship with the AFL-CIO's objectives, he replied that "we have developed a much more sophisticated attitude" toward the problem and there are "no simple answers." "But," he went on, "I can tell you that there are free trade unions operating in Brazil today."

Later in the year, however, two AFL-CIO union leaders who went to Brazil under AID's exchange program, returned with a devastating indictment of conditions for workers and unions in Brazil. James Jones, organizer for the United Steelworkers of America, a Negro, said, according to the *New York Times* dispatch from Rio de Janeiro (Nov. 23, 1966), "The leaders of unions here

have the greatest fear I have ever seen in my life. They are afraid to raise their voices on behalf of their workers for fear of police reprisals." Robert Mendez, organizer for the International Association of Machinists, also concurred in Jones' view that the purge of alleged Communist influence in unions brought "a great danger from the right."

The U.S. Department of Labor's *Monthly Labor Review* (September 1965), surveying AIFLD "educational" activity for three years, said that by mid-1965 the Washington school had 365 graduates. Some 1,600 others in 14 Latin American countries completed courses in the Institute's local or regional extensions. The *Review* also stresses that, while employers and the government are partners in the project, "the Institute remains under the complete supervision and guidance of the labor movement." Dan Kurzman reported in his *Washington Post* series that AIFLD is a target of Reuther criticism. "One complaint," he writes, "is aimed at the Institute's policy of paying trainee graduates a salary almost a year after they leave school. This does not make for independent minded union leaders, the critics say, and looks all the worse when Lovestone and his aides boast, as they have, that their pupils have plotted against undesirable governments such as the Joao Goulart Brazilian regime that was deposed in 1964. Also questioned is the presence of big

business on AIFLD's board of directors, particularly J. Peter Grace, the board chairman, not reputed to be a close friend of labor."

The second phase of AIFLD's program is no less suspect. The 3,104-unit housing development of the graphic trades unions in Mexico City was constructed with a \$10 million loan from U.S. union pension and welfare funds. The modest cooperative units cost from \$4,400 to \$7,120, depending on size, with mortgages running for 20 years. This is high even for skilled workers in Mexico. The mortgages backed by labor loans yield an interest of from six to eight per cent which the Labor Department says "is low by Latin American standards." But it is a high return on investments by U.S. standards. Union welfare and pension reserves invested in the United States don't do as well. Moreover, AFL-CIO investments in Latin American projects are guaranteed by U.S. government agencies.

There is little that AIFLD has to show in other countries, although it has many blueprints of projects in the planning stage. Critics told Kurzman of one AIFLD housing project that was supposed to get under way in 1964, but in 1966 the Institute was "still waiting for the first house to be built." One of the causes for the holdup is the haggling over usurious interest rates demanded by the Americans.

"People close to AIFLD," writes Kurzman,

"say that its announced program is suffering from pre-occupation with an unannounced activity—intelligence gathering. At least some persons working for the organization, informed sources said, have been asked to cooperate with the Central Intelligence Agency. They are told, as one informant put it, that 'Latin America's revolution must be diverted into proper channels.'" Kurzman was told the Institute is making "more enemies than friends" in Latin America because of its "engrossment with intelligence work at the expense of social development activities."

Among Victor Reuther's examples of labor "involvement" with the CIA was what he saw in the Dominican Republic when he visited that country in 1966 during its occupation by American troops. The AFL-CIO's international affairs department had thrown its support to the smallest and least representative of the four union centers in the Dominican Republic, the so-called National Federation of Free Dominican Workers (CONATRAL). This group was tied to the most reactionary forces aligned against Juan Bosch, who had the rest of labor's support. Whatever other differences the three other labor federations had, they agreed that CONATRAL was a "tool of the AFL-CIO, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency," Kurzman wrote in a dispatch from Santo Domingo to the *Washington Post* (June 14, 1966). When the revolt broke

out in Santo Domingo the first target of mass demonstrations was the headquarters of CONATRAL.

Victor Reuther, in the aforementioned interview, also said "what seems to be one of the most recent examples of CIA activities took place about two months ago, in the International Food and Drink Workers Federation headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland and supported by the AFL-CIO." He said eight agents operating in Panama posed as official representatives of the IFDWF, an ICFTU affiliate, and did so without the knowledge of general secretary J. Poulson, in Geneva. Poulson had to abolish his Panama office and notify all of the federation's affiliates of his action.

Lovestone's attitude to rightist dictatorships in Latin America is determined "largely by one factor—will they allow unions that presumably would take advice from the AFL-CIO," Kurzman was told. This is why the AFL-CIO is "entrenched" in a number of dictator-run lands, Kurzman writes, adding, "in general that policy has coincided with that of the Johnson Administration."

It is also the policy that has caused tensions within ORIT affiliates. Although McLellan's people dominate the regional ICFTU agency at the top, down in the ranks are Latin American workers who do not relish Lovestone's position that a dictator is fine if he is against "Communism" and for Washington.

It is in the dictator-run lands of Latin America, where workers suffer the worst misery, that Lovestone's apparatus is most welcomed. The growing revolt against ORIT's bureaucracy was the subject of an article in *Reporter* magazine (Feb. 25, 1965) by Gladys Delmas. She tells of the Confederation of Latin American Christian Union (CLASC) attacking ORIT leaders as stooges of "Wall Street imperialists." To this, ORIT's heads reply, CLASC "resembles, down to the comma, Muscovite propaganda."

## Africa Discovered

The AFL-CIO has shown a special interest in Africa since the late fifties when decolonization began at a rapid pace. The imperialist powers, and companies with holdings and profitable prospects in Africa, began developing a neo-colonialism to preserve their control of the continent behind a facade of independence.

A *Federationist* editorial (July 1952), signed by AFL President William Green, summarized the view of labor's leadership before most of Africa achieved independence. The editorial did not call for independence, but rather "constitutional development" within the framework of colonial rule. The "natives" should get "responsible representation" in government through "gradual development," he wrote.

The move at that time for amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was held as "basically sound" and a model for Africa. Green called for a partnership of the Europeans, who are "competent in government," and the "natives," who should be encouraged to participate under the patronage of a colonial governor. He was concerned about "Communist agents,

bent upon stirring up turmoil and upon poisoning the minds of the natives against constitutional, representative government." Green concluded, "One of the best antidotes for these revolutionary plans is the plan of the Central African Federation which guarantees representation to Europeans and special protection to natives, so there may be time for gradual development necessary for responsible representation in representative government."

To American monopolies, the Africa emerging in the fifties seemed inviting. Popular hatred of the former colonial rulers ran high. The U.S. corporations saw the prospect of exploiting the historic fact that the United States had not been a colonial power in Africa, in order to establish neo-imperialist relations through an assortment of "aid" programs. African "independence" meant a chance to invest advantageously.

The United States was also interested from a cold war standpoint in preventing a progressive, non-capitalist or socialist course of development in the new nations. Some of them did, in fact, take a course that would enable maximum mobilization of their limited resources, e.g., nationalization of key industries. Most chose the policy of non-alignment and sought aid from socialist and capitalist lands.

Africa was virgin territory for the CIA. Some new states were not yet stabilized, and

changes in governments occurred frequently. Most had only a token of trained armed forces. It was comparatively easy for the CIA to influence rebellions and invasions, as in the Congo where it used refugee Cuban mercenaries.

The CIA is not so all-powerful that it can overthrow or set up governments at will. In situations where the agency launched invasions, as in Guatemala, or had a hand in rebellions, as in British Guiana, it was successful because of weaknesses of those governments or among the progressive forces. Such opportunities were plentiful in Africa.

Penetration of African trade unions became a major tactical objective for several reasons. Some African unions were substantially developed even before liberation. They grew through economic struggles against imperialism, because the colonial masters were their real employers. Wage workers, although a minority among Africa's people, were the most dynamic and best organized force in the new order after independence. From their ranks came many leading persons in government.

The AFL-CIO sought out receptive African union leaders. One who seemed promising was Tom Mboya, the head of Kenya's unions. He was brought to the United States for a tour in 1956.

The use of U.S. Negroes as AFL-CIO missionaries in Africa was stressed, but the num-

ber in such service was not high. A school to train Africans for union leadership was set up in Kampala, Uganda, mainly with AFL-CIO money. In 1966 a change of government in Uganda placed the institution under the direction of Uganda nationals. Another school for Africans and Asians, financed by the AFL-CIO, had been in operation in Tel Aviv, Israel.

### *Meany on Non-Alignment*

Barely one week after the AFL-CIO merger in December 1955, addressing a dinner of the Religion and Labor Foundation, attended by liberals friendly to labor's top leadership, Meany denounced U.S. liberals for being against "anti-Communists." He criticized Premier Nehru of India as being "not neutral" but "an aid and ally, in fact and in effect" of the Communists. Basically, the issue was the policy of non-alignment for which Nehru was an outspoken proponent.

The policy of "neutralism" had been attacked by AFL leaders for some years. Irving Brown periodically reported in the *Federationist* on the "evils" of the spreading policy of non-alignment. The Meany-Lovestone group has always insisted that those who say they are "neutral" and refuse to fight the "Soviet menace" are "in fact and in effect" allies of Communism. Meany's speech had the effect of shocking many of his friends

among the liberals, like those in Americans for Democratic Action. The growing trend toward the idea of peaceful coexistence and the thawing of the cold war in the late fifties, as well as opposition to the developing Vietnam policy, sharpened the clash between the Meany-Lovestone circle and those generally classed as "right-wing liberals." By the time the Vietnam debate was in full swing, Meany called the pro-peace forces in the arts and professions and in liberal circles "intellectual jitterbugs."

The Meany-Lovestone attacks on the non-alignment position brought a sharp division in the merged AFL-CIO. Reuther publicly voiced his difference with Meany on Nehru. Early in 1956, amidst much publicity fanfare, he made a trip to India to dramatize his differences with Meany. That dispute touched off a chain of others, as Reuther and most of the former CIO unions took a position against Chiang Kai-shek and for admission of China into the United Nations, criticized the U.S. policy of propping up dictators in Latin America, South Korea and in Vietnam, and emphasized economic rather than military aid for the underdeveloped lands. Thus the two merged segments of labor worked at cross purposes on Latin American, Asian and African affairs from the time the unification was consummated.

Meany also attacked governments of Africa for their "totalitarian methods in labor rela-

tions." The ground given for this charge is the unions' close cooperation with their governments in building up their very limited economic resources. The unions are "mere government instruments," charged Meany. But the worst offense, according to Meany, was the virtual elimination of the ICFTU from Africa by the unions' decision not to be aligned with any world body. Meany's desire for what he calls "independence" for Africa unions is essentially a desire for a potential opposition to their respective governments. It is significant that in the long letter from Meany to all ICFTU affiliates (*AFL-CIO News*, June 12, 1965), nothing is said of making African unions more effective for the workers of big foreign corporations.

### *Rivalry to Serve Whom?*

The intense rivalry among the imperialist powers for influence in the decolonized countries, and a reflection of that rivalry within the ICFTU, was illustrated in a document meant only for British cabinet members, published by the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria in 1960.\* Apparently a labor supplement to a more general British intelligence report on African developments, the paper carried the notation, "This draft awaits

\* The paper, "Annex to Cabinet Paper on Policy in Africa," was published, with a preface, under the title, *The Great Conspiracy Against Africa*.

final amendments, elisions, and additions from C.O., C.R.O. and particularly the intelligence departments, all of whom contributed material to this draft." Not until three months after the Soviet trade union daily *Trud* published an extensive summary of the document (January 14, 1961), did the British foreign office even mention it. A British embassy spokesman in Moscow orally asked the Soviet government to repudiate its publication, claiming it was a forgery. The request was rejected and the British foreign office dropped the matter.

Dated December 12, 1959, the draft document followed by several days the Sixth Congress of the ICFTU in Brussels. The Congress, says the report, "was marked by a serious conflict between our trade union delegation and the American representatives over the future of the trade union movement in Africa." This conflict, the report continues, has become the subject of discussion "at the official level" of the two governments. Examining both the British and American concepts of unionism and their application to Africa, the report reads:

"The gradual abdication of direct British and other European rule in Africa in favor of measures to establish direct independence, makes it all the more necessary to maintain our African connections by the development of non-political means. In these conditions the role of trade unionism and, therefore, the

role of the ICFTU, have acquired a new and vital importance for us.

"This had been only partially foreseen as regards Africa when the ICFTU was founded. Recent developments there have greatly increased the importance of the unions as alternative instruments of Western influence and especially as a brake on unchecked political and national movements.

"Since it is difficult to accuse unions of serving colonial ends; with their aid it should be possible to establish harmonious relations with the new social and political institutions of Africa now being created, and with the administration of industrial and agricultural interests which we hope to maintain after any political changes. Trade union help will be needed to check irresponsible nationalization and to maintain control of the key sectors of the economy in the newly created African states.

"During the negotiations which preceded the Congress the State Department and the American trade unions made no real secret of the fact that participation of the American trade unions in the ICFTU would be used to further the developing political and economic interests of the USA in Africa.

"Reports and information on the recent secret conference of American ambassadors and senior officials in Lorenzo Marques (Mozambique) showed that general American policy toward Africa is based on decisions

adopted in connection with a secret policy report written by Mr. Richard Nixon after a visit to Africa in 1957. The more recent document prepared by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (published as Study Number 4) also confirms this. . . . The aim seems to be to take advantage of the difficult situation in which the United Kingdom and other European powers find themselves and replace their interests and influence by direct U.S. penetration in Africa using the machinery of the ICFTU and American contacts that have been built up with African leaders for this purpose."

The document then quotes extensively from Nixon's statement on Africa in which he said the Western colonial crisis presents both an opportunity and a challenge to the United States. Nixon, then Vice-President, continued, "It must be recognized that from the political point of view the European powers in Africa, including Britain and France, are irrevocably tarred with their colonial past. America is heir to no such past in Africa. It is that fact that makes her heir to Africa's future."

Nixon is quoted as urging a stepped up drive in diplomacy and investments in Africa, adding "America's interests in the future are so great as to justify us in not hesitating even to assist the departure of colonial powers in Africa. If we can win native opinion by this process the future of America in Africa will be assured."

Joseph Satterthwaite, then Assistant Secretary of State for African affairs, in his speech at Lorenzo Marques, is reported as saying: "We should do our best to influence the African peoples. This could be successfully done by exploiting the struggle against European colonialism. It is difficult for you as government officials to attack powers which are allies in NATO. But there are other ways of doing this and one of them is through the AFL-CIO contacts in the African labor movement."

The document noted Meany's report to the AFL-CIO convention earlier that year calling for "strengthening" of diplomatic missions throughout Africa with an increased labor attache corps, and exchanges of delegations. The British pointed to the former British colony of Ghana that then had only six British representatives as against 100 Americans. The report continued:

"The Americans are not interested in the creation in Africa of genuine trade unions as we know them. America has no labor party. Her trade union movement has been built from above by highly paid trade union bosses and not from below as in Great Britain and in Europe. Her trade union leaders are isolated from the rank and file and have little or no experience of trade union work as we know it. Indeed so far as they do have an understanding of our form of trade union work they condemn it as 'socialistic.' As a

result the American trade union leaders such as Meany, Reuther and Dubinsky can afford directly and openly to execute governmental and particularly CIA policy.

"The American trade union leaders have therefore always sought to build up the trade union movement in Africa on the basis of privileged leaders. Their chief weapon, following American practice, is the bribery of anti-Communist and anti-Colonial elements in the trade union and nationalist movement. In agreement with the State Department and the CIA the Americans have provided secret undercover support for such leaders as Tom Mboya, the general secretary of the Kenya Federation of Labor and the chairman of the ICFTU Area Committee for East, Central and Southern Africa."

Several other Africans friendly to the United States were named. Discussing alternative approaches to African unionism, the document finds the AFL-CIO approach of autonomous regional organizations disagreeable for the British. "In fact we have reason to believe there is an understanding between him (Tom Mboya) and the Americans and the whole emphasis on the plan for autonomy of the African Regional Organization is indeed to be used by the Americans as an indirect means for spreading their influence in Africa."

One difficulty of the American regional plan, the British noted, was that Sir Vincent

Tewson of the British Trade Union Congress was chairman of the ICFTU "Solidarity Fund." But, "The State Department and the CIA met this difficulty by promising Meany and Reuther that any funds necessary would be met from secret or, rather, 'aid' sources." The document detailed maneuvers and negotiations during the ICFTU congress by the Meany-Lovestone group to get someone more friendly to them as ICFTU president. There was talk of Irving Brown for the position. One alternative discussed was the naming of four assistant secretaries, "but what was quite unacceptable to us was that each permanent assistant secretary would be responsible for a certain area and (here lay the significance) that the American permanent assistant secretary should have charge of Africa." Irving Brown was to take that post if the plan had been accepted. As it is, the AFL-CIO bypassed the ICFTU and set up its own African-American Labor Center in New York, with Brown in charge.

### Internationalism: Meany vs. Reuther

The World Federation of Trade Unions, the most inclusive international trade union body in the world's history, had a membership of some 80 million in its affiliated unions in 1949 when secessions in preparation of a new organization began. Of the world's major unions only the AFL refused to come in when WFTU was formed. It united the old pre-war International Federation of Trade Unions, the British trade unions, all the unions of the USSR and socialist countries, the CIO, and the labor organizations of the developing countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa.

The WFTU was also the most advanced center for international labor solidarity ever known. It was born out of the struggle against fascism and colonialism. In its composition it represented a "United Nations of Labor," and this was clearly in conflict with the cold war. The WFTU was unwelcome in Washington. In 1947 the State Department set out to disrupt the WFTU, using the Marshall Plan as an issue. The plan gave U.S. dollars to Europe for postwar reconstruction in return for anti-Communist governments. No one, right or left, opposed aid for reconstruc-

tion. The real issue was whether aid should be used to buy alliances for war on the socialist countries. The Soviet trade union leaders and the WFTU vainly sought to preserve unity in the organization by agreeing that the unions of each country should decide for themselves what attitude to take to the Marshall Plan. At the same time, they urged unity on common issues among WFTU affiliates.

In February 1949, James B. Carey, then CIO secretary-treasurer, announced withdrawal of the CIO from the WFTU without even a prior meeting of the CIO Council to decide on the step. On June 25, 1949, Carey, Meany and Lovestone, together with the State Department's attaches in the 16 Marshall Plan countries, planned in Geneva the launching of the ICFTU later that year. In the United States the AFL and the CIO were in sharp conflict, spending millions of dollars raiding each other, but in Geneva, Carey and Meany were in agreement. Several weeks later, Carey attended an anti-communist conference of right-wing organizations in New York where he said, "In the last war we joined the Communists to fight the fascists; in another war we will join the fascists to fight the Communists" (*New York Herald-Tribune*, Jan. 20, 1950).

The government's security program, the use of loyalty oaths and "anti-subversive" laws, the Smith Act trials and the ruse of

McCarthyism, provided the atmosphere needed for the changed course. It is precisely the same policy of anti-Communism that later caused the rifts between the AFL-CIO leaders and the ICFTU, and within the AFL-CIO.

The European ICFTU leaders were not lacking in anti-Communism, but their members were not living in the atmosphere of McCarthyism. Their memories of war horrors and fascism came from direct experience. Their internationalist traditions were stronger than those of Americans and they had greater concern for problems other than anti-Communism. In countries like France or Italy, where the WFTU had stronger organizations, WFTU appeals for unity could not be ignored.

The British Trades Union Congress, the largest ICFTU affiliate until the AFL-CIO merger, usually led the opposition to Meany's forces. Meany threatened several times to stop U.S. contributions to the ICFTU's "solidarity fund" and even hinted at withdrawal. With each crisis the ICFTU attempted to appease the AFL-CIO. The naming of C. A. Millard of Canada as ICFTU organization head, was greeted as a solution. Another compromise was the autonomous regional form of organization. But as cold war tensions wore off, and the image of the United States grew uglier to the world, the

leaders of the unions abroad became more stubborn against yielding to Meany.

In 1957 the Free Trade Union Committee of the AFL was abolished in exchange for Millard's appointment. But the "Lovestone international" continued and expanded. The ICFTU office in Brussels has no real authority in Latin America. Its regional organization ORIT is entirely in AFL-CIO hands. Having failed to get ICFTU machinery in Africa, the AFL-CIO, as we have seen, set up its own African-American Labor Council in New York under Irving Brown. In 1966, the AFL-CIO Executive Council decided to substantially cut its annual financial contribution to the ICFTU and channel more of its funds to its own international department.

Tensions between the AFL-CIO leadership and the ICFTU grew to the point that Meany asserted in a press conference in Miami Beach in March 1965 that the ICFTU has been "going downhill" since its birth in 1949 and that its Brussels office is infiltrated by homosexuals. Meany's letter in *AFL-CIO News* (June 12, 1965) declares, "The changes which have occurred in the international situation in the last 15 years do not require the ICFTU to change its basic objectives. . . . Today as then (1949) it is the major task of the ICFTU to fight against Communism." The basic trouble, Meany complained, is "the relaxation of international tensions" because it helps the "Communists."

AFL-CIO support to the U.S. war in Vietnam has isolated the federation's leaders from world labor as never before. Many ICFTU unions, even in neighboring Canada, take a direct or implied position critical of the Vietnam policy. At the 1965 ICFTU congress Meany's effort to get a resolution backing the United States in Vietnam met with failure.

Another important indicator of the isolation of the Meany-Lovestone group is the growing desire of ICFTU affiliates to be friendly with unions of the Soviet Union and other socialist lands. In 1966 alone, notes P. Pimenov, secretary of the Central Council of Trade Unions of the USSR (*New Times*, Nov. 30, 1966), official visiting delegations as guests of the Soviet unions included the British Trade Union Congress, consisting of its top-level leaders; the West German Federation of Trade Unions; the Belgian, New Zealand and Australian labor federations; the Christian unions of France, and many others. The TUC of Britain is the largest ICFTU affiliate in Europe. The West German unions were usually Meany's strongest support in Europe.

#### *Reuther Disagrees*

On the last day of the 1965 AFL-CIO convention, Walter Reuther rose to defend the resolution pledging "unstinting support" for the government's Vietnam policy, against

criticism by Emil Mazey, secretary-treasurer of Reuther's union. Five months later, at the direction of the United Automobile Workers' executive board, Reuther sent a sharply-worded letter to Meany criticizing the latter's boycott of the 1966 International Labor Organization conference in Geneva because it elected a Polish representative as chairman.

Reuther wrote, "The leadership and membership of the UAW, like many other Americans, are deeply disturbed about the growing negative character of AFL-CIO policy in the field of international affairs, of which the withdrawal of AFL-CIO delegates from the current International Labor Organization is but the latest expression. . . . (The action) was unwise, undemocratic and unfortunate, and was a distinct disservice to the AFL-CIO, to the free world labor movement, to our nation and to the cause of international understanding, peace and freedom. . . . The walkout of the AFL-CIO delegates from the ILO conference has isolated the American labor movement and further strained our relationship with the other democratic free trade union organizations whose delegates stayed in the ILO conference."

Reuther challenged the concept that international affairs is the private reserve of Meany and Lovestone. Noting that the order to withdraw from the conference was given without prior consultation or discussion with the leadership of the federation, Reuther

served notice that henceforth his 1,600,000 member union, "as an autonomous affiliate," will insist on exercising its rights "on all policy matters, both foreign and domestic."

Reuther's letter came immediately after his brother's charge of "involvement" in the CIA and the earlier charge of association with CIA policy in Santo Domingo. That same week, Victor Reuther charged Lovestone with successfully intervening to stop State Department visas for a Soviet trade union delegation invited to the United States by the UAW. Two weeks earlier the UAW's own convention returned, in some respects, to its earlier position on Vietnam in opposition to further escalation, and called for admission of People's China to the UN, and closer relations and exchanges with the Soviet Union.

Pragmatism, short-range "practicalism," political ties and changing public opinion produce contradictions which often make the course of U.S. labor look like a fever chart. The seeming agreements between Reuther and Meany only need a provocation like the boycott of the ILO to burst into flames. It is essentially the same explosive material that has brought the AFL-CIO leadership into conflict with the rest of the world's labor movement.

Since it became a United Nations agency, the ILO has been an arena of conflict between the U.S. representatives and the Soviet Union.

U.S. labor delegates had been uncompromising in their opposition to admission of socialist countries into the ILO. Nevertheless, the doors were now open to many delegates from newly-liberated lands and from all socialist countries.

For the first time in the ILO's history, it was possible for it to become an effective agency for the negotiation of treaties, setting meaningful world-wide norms for protection of working people. The large representation from countries emerging from colonialism and seeking to overcome primitive working conditions, became a strong force for turning the organization into something more than a center for research and publication. The participation of representatives from socialist countries, where rules for protection of labor are the most advanced in the world, also promised to become a catalyst for progress.

However, the AFL-CIO managed to get enough votes to adjust the rules so as virtually to prohibit the election of representatives from socialist countries to the ILO's governing body. Their theory was that labor and management representatives of socialist countries cannot fit into the ILO's tri-partite labor-management-government system, because to their minds "management" can only come from private ownership.

In 1959, as a result of continued U.S. allegations of the lack of freedom of association in the USSR, the ILO directed its

Freedom of Association Survey Division to send missions to the USSR and the United States to investigate. John Price, chief of the division and special assistant to the director of the ILO, headed both the U.S. and USSR missions. In 1960, the ILO published two reports, *The Trade Union Situation in the USSR* and *The Trade Union Situation in the United States*. The AFL-CIO's allegations were refuted in a comprehensive, generally positive, report on the work of the Soviet trade unions. The report on the United States, on the other hand, was quite critical of the AFL-CIO affiliates, chiefly on grounds of discrimination, bureaucracy and corruption.

On June 1, 1966, the ILO conference elected for the first time a representative of a socialist country to be the chairman of the sessions. The decisive votes for the Polish representative came from socialist and non-aligned countries, but a number of ICFTU delegates from Western Europe also broke traditional lines. The AFL-CIO delegates walked out and announced they would boycott the sessions. In response, the labor section of the ILO elected a top Soviet trade union leader to its governing body.

#### *Pandora's Box Opens*

When the UAW executive board protested Meany's boycott order and challenged his

right to take such measures without even consulting other leaders, it set a precedent for a continuing debate within U.S. labor.

Although the special Executive Council meeting called by Meany (after the boycott was in effect) approved his action by a vote of 18 to six, it was the first time a contested vote was forced on such an issue and foreign policy debated in the council.

At two subsequent meetings of the Executive Council in 1966 division sharpened between Meany and Reuther. At the August 22 meeting in Chicago, as we have noted, Meany's majority rejected the charges of "involvement" with the CIA and reaffirmed support of Johnson's Vietnam war policy. Reuther denounced that statement as "intemperate, hysterical, jingoistic and unworthy" of labor. The rift widened at the November 14 session that was scheduled to discuss foreign policy. Apparently concluding that there is little use debating issues behind closed doors in a circle with a built-in Meany-Lovestone majority, Reuther announced that his union's board decided henceforth to follow an "independent" course, and he refused to attend the Council meeting. He announced that "time will demonstrate what I mean by a more independent course of action" (*New York Times*, Dec. 6, 1966).

Some weeks later, Reuther and his associate top officers sent a letter to all UAW locals in which they outlined the differences

under ten major topics. In addition to differences over international affairs, they said the controlling group in the AFL-CIO "lacks the social vision and dynamic thrust" and a "crusading spirit" on organization of the unorganized, programs for migratory workers and millions of working poor, a wages and bargaining policy to meet the new technology, civil rights, programs for public workers, new progressive legislative objectives, a more comprehensive social security system, involvement of all labor in a war on poverty, on relations with the "liberal, intellectual and academic community" and America's youth, and on relations with the world trade union movement. Finally, the Meany leadership is sharply criticized for bureaucracy and for stifling "creative, frank and meaningful democratic discussion" in the AFL-CIO.

In contrast, the November 14 Executive Council meeting (which Reuther refused to attend), after a brief session going through the motions of "reviewing" the major 19 foreign policy issues that came before it in 11 years since the merger, issued a statement declaring that its every act was "justified by events." When a newsman asked whether that meant the Council "found no mistakes whatsoever," Meany replied, "yep" and added, "No, we can't find any mistakes."

Apparently anticipating a barrage of red-baiting attacks from the Meany-Lovestone

side, the UAW's leaders in their letter to the locals gave assurance that they remain as anti-Communist as ever and even claimed their program for progressive objectives is "the most effective way to fight Communism." Nor should it be overlooked that throughout the 11 years under review, Reuther had usually voted for the Executive Council's foreign policy statements or recorded no objections in its meetings. It was hardly necessary for the UAW leaders to argue that Communism is not the issue, for it certainly is not. But the limited advances advocated by the UAW toward peace and closer relations with world labor, including unions of socialist countries, certainly do raise an issue. Moreover, the growing realization that attachment of labor to an imperialist war course is the major roadblock to labor militancy and general progress is a real challenge to prevailing AFL-CIO policy.

On February 3, the UAW executive board announced the resignation of Walter Reuther from the AFL-CIO vice-presidency, the Executive Council and from a number of its sub-commissions. All other UAW officials did the same. A letter to the membership explaining the step was even more sharply critical of the Meany leadership declaring it "advanced few new ideas and lacks the necessary vitality, vision, imagination and social invention" to meet the problems of the changing world, and has become "increasingly the

comfortable, complacent custodian of the status quo." Meany is charged with "discouraging in-depth discussion of basic policy issues" and refusal to "share democratic leadership," in the formulation of policies. The letter also contained the first part of the UAW's program for the labor movement to take it "off dead center" and become a "vanguard of social progress."

Unquestionably, the UAW's is the most advanced program from a significant section of labor since the early CIO years. It is not without contradictions, however. It still plays with the dangerous formula of "free world *vs* Communism." At the same time the UAW says it aims to "minimize world tensions" and "build bridges of understanding among peoples" to assure peace and freedom. As that letter went to the membership, a delegation of Soviet trade unionists invited by the UAW was awaited in the United States. In the summer of 1966 a delegation of UAW members, including Victor Reuther and vice-president Pat Greathouse, was warmly welcomed by the Soviet trade unions. Reuther reported favorable impressions of the trip at meetings of AFL-CIO unionists. Surely, such approaches and actions make for understanding and peace with lands of socialism and not for war upon them.

Notwithstanding the contradiction, the steps taken by the UAW leaders were welcomed in the ranks of the active pro-peace

movement. The dynamics and trend of an active movement for the objectives set by the UAW can shove cold war hangovers to the background.

The trend within the AFL-CIO in opposition to Meany's monopoly on foreign affairs, is also an indication of the influence and pressure from sections of the population that have been historically allied to labor. The movement against U.S. policy in Vietnam has gathered tens of thousands of persons prominent in the academic, art, literary and other professional fields; churchmen up to the highest levels from all denominations, and political leaders including some members of Congress.

Especially important has been the trend in the Negro freedom movement to connect the fights for freedom and against poverty, with the movement for peace and national liberation.

The hypocritical concern for "freedom" in top Council circles of the AFL-CIO is all the more apparent when one remembers that it took the Civil Rights upsurge to force some of the major unions to take even elementary steps against discrimination. Meany's own plumbers union, and most of the others in building trades, have not to this day taken meaningful steps to give Negroes full equality and job opportunity. The unions that provide basic support for the Meany-Lovestone group have the worst record on discrimination.

It is ironic that Lovestone always makes sure that about a hundred guests from foreign unions, particularly from Africa, attend AFL-CIO conventions. The delegates are asked to come clad in their national dress. The Africans are usually disappointed when they see fewer than a dozen Negro delegates, an indication of the scarcity of Negroes at the leadership level. At the AFL-CIO convention in San Francisco in 1959, just a few weeks before the big struggle over Africa took place in Brussels, the foreign guests saw A. Philip Randolph, sole Negro vice-president, argue, against overwhelming opposition, for a resolution to bar jimcrow local unions. Chairman George Meany answered by shouting, "Who the hell appointed you the champion of the Negro workers of America?"

#### *Trade Unionists for Peace*

Peace advocates in the trade unions, now beginning to speak out as fear of the top bureaucracy declines, welcome the challenge to the Meany-Lovestone monopoly on foreign affairs by as influential a leader as Walter Reuther and as powerful a union as the UAW. A free discussion on foreign policy issues within unions has been the major objective of the spreading group of trade unionists for peace.

It is by no means assured that Reuther and his followers in the AFL-CIO will follow

through consistently on the steps they have taken and really challenge the controlling bureaucracy. Notwithstanding the evidence that Reuther and those generally associated with him have been in frequent conflict with the Meany-Dubinsky-Lovestone policies, Reuther's course over 30 years has not been a consistent one.

There were times when Reuther was even to the right of Philip Murray, during and after World War II. He was very active in the expulsion of the ten CIO unions in 1949. He did not oppose the Korean war and contributed to the *Colliers* magazine fantasy, noted earlier, in which he saw himself flying into a conquered USSR to "reorganize" the unions there.

But following that, Reuther issued a number of statements and the UAW passed resolutions critical of U.S. policy and receptive to coexistence with the USSR. Reuther was critical of the Guatemala venture, U.S. support of Diem in Saigon, Chiang Kai-shek and South Korea's Syngman Rhee. He challenged Meany's attacks on Nehru and non-alignment, and welcomed the test-ban treaty and summit talks. He became a sponsor of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy and addressed its meetings.

But in 1965, a few months after his union took a stand critical of escalation of the war in Vietnam and called for serious steps for peace, Reuther and a majority on his union's

board shifted to an endorsement of President Johnson's policy of escalation. At the 1965 AFL-CIO convention he defended the pledge of "instinting support" for the war. Several months later the UAW's own convention took some steps toward returning to its earlier anti-escalation position.

Apologists for Reuther have "explanations." His early shifts were in the midst of his pre-occupation with his union's internal ten-year power struggle and his factional relations. The opposition of former Steelworkers' President David McDonald to a peace position is cited for Reuther's difficulties in the CIO. Later, some explain, his acts were motivated by a fear of undermining the AFL-CIO merger. Of course there is the strong pull of his relations with the Truman, Kennedy and Johnson administrations, guided by the rule among labor leaders that you can't tell when you may need a White House favor.

Nevertheless, the tension today between Reuther and Meany is sharper, and the challenge is stronger and over a wider range of issues than before.

### *The World Assembly Line*

During the week in June 1966 that the Reuthers attacked Meany and Lovestone, delegates of automobile workers' unions from 14 countries met in Detroit at the UAW's

invitation and expense, to dramatize a different approach to labor internationalism than cooperation with the CIA. Representing 1,440,000 members in General Motors, Chrysler and Ford plants around the world, they met to plan a united struggle for common objectives against these giant corporations.

"Wages, production standards, grievance procedures, fringe demands, are what we are here to discuss," said Walter Reuther as he opened the conference. "Remember, GM and the other companies are not in business to make cars but to make profits. GM has no basic loyalty to any one country. GM will shift from one country to another if it will make a profit."

The conference was made possible through the International Metalworkers Federation of the ICFTU, of which Reuther is president. Adolph Graedel, IMF general secretary, told the conference of a speech in which the president of Ford Motors in Australia had said, "Maybe one day we can have a giant body-making plant in Japan, and a giant engine-making plant in Australia and maybe a carburetor plant somewhere else and swap parts around our car assembly plants around the world." The statement adopted by the Detroit conference indicates its approach to the problem:

"The world policy proclaimed by the corporations means buying human labor in the

cheapest markets, seeking out investment opportunities at the lowest possible level of social and economic responsibility, and selling the products in the dearest markets.

"Only through the solidarity of the workers of the whole world automotive industry and the coordination of our union efforts can we assure ourselves against the harmful effects of these strategies of the big international corporations. We have noted that the Big Three take advantage of their giant power in countries which are only entering industrial development, and harass and persecute workers by methods which are illegal in the advanced industrial societies. They resort to anti-union victimization, to discriminatory and unfair discharges, to undemocratic and often indecent practices.

"To contend with this, we consider the organization of world-wide councils of workers in GM, Ford, Chrysler, Fiat, Simca and Roots as an urgent and historic step into the future."

The statement was supplemented by a program of objectives in terms of wages, pensions, job security, guaranteed income and working conditions. Seen from their goal, the world assembly line is not limited to unions affiliated with the ICFTU. The French and Italian plants have strong WFTU unions and large numbers of Japan's auto workers have fraternal relations with the WFTU. The conference set an example to the workers in

steel, electronics, aluminum, copper and other fields with international assembly lines. This line of internationalism against the giant corporations runs in direct contradiction to Meany's, which would ease the monopolies' path in Latin America, Africa and Asia.

### *Public Relations vs. Reality*

AFL-CIO public relations assure us that committees on international affairs review policy in resolutions approved at biennial conventions. But from convention proceedings, it is apparent that only formal rubber-stamp approval takes place. In more than 30 years of experience covering labor relations, this writer can recall only some discussion on foreign policy in the CIO prior to 1949 when the cold-war expulsions took place, and the rare case of Emil Mazey's speech in opposition to the Vietnam war policy at the AFL-CIO San Francisco convention in 1965.

What most people do not know is that at least 95 per cent of the vote at AFL-CIO conventions does not come from *elected* delegates. Almost all delegates are named by the general executive boards of their respective unions. Unions cast as many votes as their per-capita payments. As few as ten of the largest unions can cast as many votes as the rest of the convention. About 15 of the old-line AFL unions can outvote the rest of the

delegates. It is erroneous, therefore, to claim that Meany and Lovestone obtain consent for what they are doing from the membership. According to every measure of opinion, as expressed in their organizations or through polls, members of the AFL-CIO do not differ from the rest of the population on public policy questions, especially on matters affecting war or peace.

It would be a mistake to look upon the labor movement as a solid mass of millions of workers and their families with a single viewpoint, which is reflected by George Meany. A tiny bureaucracy at the top claims to represent "labor" on foreign affairs, but that bureaucracy avoids a public debate on the issues. It is significant that a growing number of unions take issue with the Johnson policy on Vietnam in their national conventions, among them the auto, clothing, packinghouse, retail and department store unions.

A movement for setting up local and regional bodies of trade unionists for peace, including local, district and some national union officials, is gaining support. The Sane Nuclear Policy Committee has established a trade union division.

A sizable section (about 20 per cent) of organized labor is not in the AFL-CIO and has no friendly attitude to the Meany-Lovestone policy on foreign affairs, or on most other problems. The independent United

Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, and the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (now merged with Steel) have been consistently for a peaceful foreign policy. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the largest union in the country, allows its local and regional affiliates to do as they see fit on foreign policy questions. The union's St. Louis district and its paper, the *Missouri Teamster* under vice-president Harold Gibbons, are among the sharpest critics of Johnson's Vietnam policy.

### *Unions Cannot Be By-passed*

Unfortunately, large numbers of people in the peace movement—academic and professional circles, the clergy, women's organizations and the students—know little about the workings of trade unions. Until the recent flareup within the AFL-CIO Executive Council came to public attention, they only read of the "official" position. A belief has grown that perhaps unions are a base for conservatism, and progress may be made faster if they are by-passed.

Historically, it is when workers and their organizations moved that movements for social progress advanced with the greatest vigor. This was the experience with the CIO upsurge in the late thirties, and again when masses of the Negro people—predominantly

working people—rose to activate their middle-class led organizations, giving dynamic qualities to the Civil Rights Revolution. This has been the experience throughout the world.

The movement for peace among professionals, women, church people and students is of extraordinary importance. But if this crusade is to be ultimately successful, it must see the trade union movement as it is—differentiated at all levels of leadership. One cannot speak of "labor" as though it were a solid monolithic group; nor is it correct to say that "labor" does this or "labor" thinks that, because the image of Meany and his group as "labor" is false.

Meany, Lovestone and Dubinsky and their like should be exposed for their service to American imperialism. But as the record of many years shows, there are leaders even at top levels, not to mention a much wider base closer to the rank and file, who represent substantial sections of the labor movement and who cannot be classed with Meany's group. They need to feel both a more active support and a greater pressure from peace forces inside and outside the unions. The feeling that "labor is reactionary" can be dispelled by examining the differences in labor, by seeing who in labor is for peace, who is against it; who in labor wants international unity against the monopolies and

who wants unity with them; who in labor is fighting for civil rights and who is covering up discrimination; who in labor pays lip service to a war on poverty and who actively presses that struggle.

The problem is how to build the broadest possible unity for peace in trade union ranks, notwithstanding the confusion and inconsistency, while directing fire at the main enemies of peace in the labor movement, the Meany-Lovestone circle and their supporters. Obviously, broad unity would of necessity include persons in union leadership whose past record on foreign affairs may not encourage confidence. But there really are no guarantees. The only really effective pressure for a peace policy in the unions is an active trade-unionists-for-peace movement of the rank and file workers and of leaders at the lower levels. The Committee for Sane Nuclear Policy has initiated one form of such a movement by chartering union chapters like those for the New York-New Jersey, Chicago and Los Angeles regions. Some may prefer other forms. But whatever the form, it has to be an active movement in the shops, communities and locals if it is to have influence. As it is, the Meany-Lovestone team "speaks" for labor only by default, because the pro-peace trend among the union workers is not articulated or given active organized expression to anywhere near its potential force.

Resolutions for a peace policy in a convention, board or meeting of a local union are fine. But they are only the initial phase. Their implementation by action at the shop and community level is what really counts.

## 9

## Some Conclusions

The AFL-CIO, as Reuther and many others conceive, is in a crisis over its international affairs and other major policy. While the trend in the world and in the United States has been toward greater involvement of people's organizations in the struggle for peace and against the global monopolies, the AFL-CIO bureaucracy maintains the International Affairs Department as an appendage to the State Department and the CIA in support of an endless succession of wars and paramilitary operations.

Practically since World War I days, this kind of labor leadership has held that trade union international relations should be built on the basis of anti-Communism. This policy has now brought the dominant AFL-CIO leadership to share a common position with the most violent cold-warriors and into conflict with the labor movement of the world, including the ICFTU.

At the same time, the pressure of events in the world and in the United States has also led to the rise of a significant opposition and challenge to this long entrenched policy. There is no guarantee, of course, that this challenge will succeed. But there is stronger

pressure now than ever before for putting the AFL-CIO's international affairs on a democratic basis.

This would mean abolition of clique control and an end of secrecy in the federation's affairs; an end to the right of Meany, or any other official, to make arbitrary policy decisions. It would mean permitting and encouraging free discussion in union ranks by guaranteeing at all levels, from locals to conventions, the right to dissent free from fear. It would mean the restructuring of the International Affairs Department to make possible the participation of representatives of all affiliates. After many years of a policy deliberately designed to make world affairs "George Meany's business," it has now become a pressing problem to re-educate union members to have their say on labor's foreign policy, to break down the "let George do it" habit.

The policy of perpetual anti-Communism dominant for a half century under Gompers, Green and Meany (and for periods in the CIO under Murray and Reuther) has been proven to be a policy for war, both in theory and practice. If the possibility of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems is denied, the end result must be war and justification of every act that leads to war.

The federation's international department has called only two conferences on foreign affairs to which affiliates were invited (both

#### SOME CONCLUSIONS

very poorly attended). One, held under Woll's leadership shortly before World War II ended, was on post-war perspectives. The emphasis was not on guaranteeing the death of fascism, but on "containment" of the Soviet Union. The other conference, noted earlier, was in April 1960, on the eve of a scheduled summit conference, to disparage an agreement with the Soviet Union.

#### *Independence from Government Policy*

To make any changes in its international affairs meaningful, the AFL-CIO should declare complete independence from the State Department and break all ties to intelligence agencies and the paramilitary operations of the CIA. This, of course, would also mean rejection of the concept of blind loyalty to government policy. It may not mean opposition to every government policy, but simply that labor would decide its position independently and democratically.

The AFL-CIO leadership continues to follow the State Department in a subservient manner, although the only "representation" the unions have in government foreign affairs are the "labor attaches" and labor information officers attached to many embassies. These attaches are usually named on AFL-CIO recommendation, and given the menial task of what amounts to intelligence. The government simply does not trust a labor

man, even of Meany's circle, for much else.

Present AFL-CIO policy makes labor subservient politically, and thus weakens both its militancy and its ability to broaden the organized base. The level of U.S. unionization is lower than in most major capitalist countries in the world. Less than a fourth of our labor force is in unions. The unionized section has declined to 29 per cent of the non-agricultural labor force. There are two reasons for this. First, the government has never fully granted workers complete legal protection to organize and bargain collectively. Every law is so amended by restraints or court rulings that at best it is only a partial right. New anti-labor laws are constantly enacted to place new restrictions. Thus the Wagner Act was emaciated with the Taft-Hartley Law. "Right-to-work" laws supplemented Taft-Hartley. The Landrum-Griffin Law amended Taft-Hartley with more restrictions. Unions have to perpetually struggle for the right to organize and bargain.

The second reason for organized labor's decline is AFL-CIO attachment to government foreign policy, which inevitably takes primacy over all other matters. Thus, the government gets more authority to intervene in strikes, sets wage freezes, places "security" measures of police control at many work locations, and postpones for "emergency" reasons domestic improvements in general. Such periods come often. In the span of one gener-

ation, World War II, the Korean and Vietnam wars each imposed restrictions on workers.

A CIO organizing drive which developed in the South in 1946-47, lost its momentum and died as the cold war and anti-Communist hysteria rose. Today, there is little evidence of the organizing drives the AFL-CIO and its Industrial Union Department began in certain areas. Very modest medical aid for the aged is the only new social legislation passed since Roosevelt's New Deal, and took almost 20 years of campaigning to achieve. The Vietnam war virtually ended the "anti-poverty" program of the Johnson administration, making that program a cruel joke on the 35 million people in poverty. The rise in the cost of living caused by fast-rising expenditures on Vietnam, new taxes and higher social security deductions, has substantially reduced the purchasing power of the people.

Nor are civil rights advanced by a cold war foreign policy. When the government wants the support of the Southern bloc in Congress for its war program, it does not bring pressure for enforcement of civil rights laws. Neither is the government likely to cancel orders to firms that discriminate if those orders concern military supplies. A. Philip Randolph voiced fear on these grounds at the 1965 AFL-CIO convention:

"I cannot close without commenting on the great danger that may lie ahead. In times

of war or international crisis, as you know, there is a tendency to divert attention away from the crying domestic needs and problems. Even now there are those who would exploit the serious situation in Vietnam for their own narrow political purposes. Already we have heard the reactionary voices of Senators Stennis (Miss.) and Russell (Ga.) and other segregationists. They call for a cutback in the war on poverty; they would push the struggle for racial equality off the stage of history; they feel strengthened in their opposition to labor's struggle for industrial democracy."

The months that followed more than confirmed Randolph's fears. Long-accumulated frustrations exploded and turned many ghettos into battlefields. Floyd McKissick, director of the Congress of Racial Equality, said the war in Vietnam was a major factor in these outbursts. The real anti-poverty expenditures by government do not amount in two years to the sum spent monthly in military intervention for alleged "freedom" in Vietnam. Moreover, there is bitterness because of the disproportionate number of Negro soldiers killed in Vietnam—18.3 per cent of the total in 1966.

#### *On Political Influence*

If the praise labor leaders get for backing candidates in elections were a measure of political strength, then the trade unions would

indeed be politically powerful. But in fact they are not. The trade unions made a big contribution to the Johnson sweep in 1964, but not a half dozen elected to Congress in that sweep could be called "labor" men. There is not another industrial country in the world with so little labor representation in government as in the United States. American labor elects only "friends" who are more often influenced by others. Many who owed their election to Congress in 1964 to active union support, disappointed labor in its unsuccessful effort to repeal the anti-union Section 14b of the Taft-Hartley Law. In most countries, labor wins influence and respect through struggle and sharp opposition to policies not in the interest of the working class.

A permanent commitment to back government foreign policy surrenders the union's independence on the key political issue of the day. The labor movement thereby loosens its ties with vital sections of the population usually friendly to unions, but to whom peace is the primary issue. Unity for any popular movement today is impossible unless peace is one of the major common issues. A candidate's good domestic record alone is no longer acceptable for a growing number of voters who look to something better than a life of perpetual war or fear of war.

But the policy of the Meany-Lovestone team presents the trade unions to the public

as having a common position with the ultra-rightists, whose major policy is incitement of war against the socialist countries and intervention wherever revolutionary movements may arise.

The trade union movement cannot make its full force felt in political action if, on the key issue of the day, its spokesmen sound like those who call for more anti-union laws and oppose every social-economic advance sought by labor. The 1966 congressional elections that brought heavy losses for the Johnson administration, with the hardest blows at many classed as "friends of labor," showed the futility of seeking political progress through an alliance with a war administration.

#### *Peace vs. "Invisible Government"*

Americans everywhere are asking who makes American foreign policy and what that policy really is. The fact can no longer be concealed that there is a gigantic CIA paramilitary apparatus directed by men from America's largest corporations who provide an air force, naval craft, U-2 spy planes, clandestine radio and electronic devices, thousands of analysts and research technicians, enabling this "invisible government" to invade lands, overthrow or install governments, incite mob action and even organize massacres and assassinations.

James Burnham, in the ultra-rightist *Na-*

*tional Review* (July 12, 1966) asks, "Why should it even be stated publicly who the director of the CIA is? From the point of view of effective performance, the CIA should have no official press relations; none of its officers should be publicly identified; nothing should ever be officially admitted about its activities, whether mistakes or triumphs. If others discuss the Bay of Pigs, MIT centers, U-2 Overflights, Congresses for Cultural Freedom, Michigan seminars or airlines of Laos, let that be their affair. Mum's the word. Mum's always the word from headquarters. An effective CIA organization must be, in short, professional."

The truth is that Burnham summarized the actual practice of the CIA. It can plot the assassination of a president somewhere, and there would be no way to find out who did it or why. The CIA operates both independently and secretly, but the much-circulated view that there are two governments is groundless. There is only one government in the United States and it is directed from Washington. However, its structural form is such since the CIA was formed that the government can technically evade responsibility for policies or deeds it does not want to acknowledge publicly, since they are violations of international law. That is the purpose of an "invisible" arm.

The technique of concealment serves to evade responsibility only during the crime.

At some later stage, when the facts are exposed, not even a statement of regret is issued. This is repeated so many times that it has become routine in U.S. diplomacy. Victor Reuther's charge of labor involvement with the CIA is basically that the AFL-CIO's international affairs department is a key instrument for putting over this policy in the name of the workers of America.

The Vietnam war shows how far this policy can take America. The widespread opposition to this "dirty war" has raised anew the question of "controlling" the CIA. But even the effort in Congress to permit only three Senators to look into CIA affairs was defeated.

However, this much-publicized struggle for a "watchdog" committee over the CIA does not go to the heart of the problem. Such a committee would not be composed of persons opposed to the secret machinery. It would have no authority to curb CIA activities and would know only what the agency wanted it to know. The basic question is really the foreign policy of the United States. A genuine policy for peace would make the CIA as superfluous as the monthly expenditure of \$2 billion and countless lives for the "little war" in Southeast Asia.

Exposures of the CIA serve to weaken this weapon of imperialism. They alert the world to such paramilitary techniques as were used in Cuba, Iran, Guatemala, Guyana, Lebanon, Brazil, Laos, the Congo, the Dominican Re-

public, Indonesia and Vietnam. But in the final analysis the American people will defeat this policy of hypocrisy and neo-imperialist expansion only when they win a real foreign policy of peace.

The labor movement can well profit from the public reaction to exposures of the CIA. Disclosures of CIA financing of the National Student Association sent a wave of anger and bitterness through the campuses, for they left a feeling in the students that they were secretly linked to something very dirty. James Reston, Washington columnist and associate editor of the *New York Times*, who had the inside track to the story, stressed in his analysis (Feb. 15, 1967) that much more than NSA's link to the CIA was involved. CIA funds for "the press and trade unions of the world have been seriously hampered by the disclosure," wrote Reston. The disclosure "creates political difficulties for the President" and "places in jeopardy CIA programs to anti-Communist publications, radio and television stations, and labor unions," he added.

Senator Eugene McCarthy (Minn.) pressing for a Senate probe, confirmed Reston's view when he called for extension of the probe to the reported involvement of the CIA in recent years in "universities, labor unions, foundations, book publishing, broadcasting and refugee groups" (*New York Times*, Feb. 16). "CIA has become an operat-

ing arm of the State Department overseas," he said. "It appears that it has also become an operating arm of the State Department at home."

Clearly what Reuther said of CIA involvement in the labor movement, and what is already known, is only an advance indication of what will become known before long about the trade union links to the CIA. The demand for the truth should come from the unionists. The labor movement need not bear the brandmark "CIA" because of the role of Meany, Lovestone, Dubinsky and their associates.

## Epilogue

As this volume was about to go to press, the country was shocked by exposures in *Ramparts* magazine (March 1967) of CIA financing of the National Student Association. In quick order came disclosures of the flow of many CIA millions to labor, educational, publishing and other organizations in the United States.

As the NSA exposure was featured in blazing headlines, Victor Reuther told the press, "there is a lot bigger story in the CIA's financial and other connections with the AFL-CIO than with students. . . . I did my best to try to lift the lid on it. And some day it will all come out" (*New York Post*, Feb. 16, 1967). Within days many of these connections were revealed. The following is a summary of the revelations concerning the trade unions and the CIA as they were reported during the last two weeks of February 1967. In general, these facts substantiate or enlarge upon charges previously made, and which are analyzed and discussed in this book.

With two CIA agents in charge of its international affairs department, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employes (AFL-CIO) received at least \$60,000 annually to finance its work, mostly in Latin

America, from perhaps as early as 1958 until 1964. In that last year Jerry Wurf defeated the incumbent president of the union, Arnold Zander, ousted the two CIA men and cut relations with the agency. As Zander himself revealed (*Washington Post*, Feb. 23), the union's international department was for six years a cover for CIA operations in British Guiana (now Guyana) and had an active hand in the campaign of rioting and sabotage against the Jagan government.\* The AFSCME also spent CIA money in the name of the Public Services International, an ICFTU affiliate with headquarters in London, as Zander claimed, for the "organization" of public workers all over the world, "especially in Latin America and Africa." Apparently, those CIA-financed activities had priority over the organization of millions of public workers not in unions in this country.

The ICFTU's International Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers, with headquarters in Denver, was used similarly as a cover for CIA activity. It was headed by O. A. Knight until 1965, when he retired from the presidencies of both the International Federation and the International Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers (AFL-CIO). An AFL-CIO vice-president until his retirement,

\* For a discussion of this and other forms of U.S. intervention, see Cheddi Jagan, *The West on Trial*, especially Chap. XIV, "Sabotage and Subversion," New York, 1967.

Knight had long been involved in Latin American committees and projects of the federation. During Knight's tenure, it was disclosed, the ICFTU's affiliate received a monthly subsidy of \$25,000 from a CIA conduit, the Andrew Hamilton Foundation, with a Philadelphia address. Other foundations fronting for the CIA channeled more hundreds of thousands of dollars to Knight's organization (*Washington Post*, Feb. 23).

The American Newspaper Guild, one of the AFL-CIO's smallest unions, appeared to be the recipient of the largest sums from CIA dummy foundations. Charles Perlik, secretary-treasurer of the Guild, admitted receiving \$1,004,000 within three years from several funds identified as CIA channels. The organization whose work was financed by the CIA is known as the Inter-American Federation of Working Newspapermen's Organizations, of which Perlik is co-chairman. Like many others caught in the CIA's web, Perlik professed surprise when the source of the funds was exposed. And like others, he claimed that irrespective of the source of the funds, the work of the Guild—mainly in Latin America, but also in Asia and Africa, through the parent International Federation of Journalists in Brussels—was "independent" and in no way influenced by the CIA.

Following the exposures, as a wave of anger spread in the Guild's chapters, the *Guild Reporter* (Feb. 24) carried a long report by

ANG international affairs director Richard P. Davis. He assured the members that their money was untouched, because all salaries and expenditures of his department were covered by "foundation grants." This, of course, means CIA grants. In answer to demands for an accounting of what was done in the Guild's name with a million CIA dollars, Davis noted a "three-month journalism seminar in Saigon," a seminar on "trade unionism" in Turkey, and a series of "journalism" seminars in Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Liberia and the Congo. He boasted that "journalism" seminars were in progress in Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador and other Latin America countries. The CIA pays for all of this, presumably because of its high regard for good standards of journalism in these lands.

Another union that showed extraordinary interest in world activities is the Retail Clerks International Association; its president, James Suffridge, is a vice-president of the AFL-CIO and very close friend of Meany. Suffridge, too, professed surprise at the disclosure that the same Granary Fund which funneled CIA funds to NSA, the Newspaper Guild and other organizations, gave the RCIA \$38,000 in 1965—to mention one item that came to light. The RCIA, one of America's most bureaucratically run unions, had two of its officials among the corps of AFL-CIO advisers who came to guide the Guyanese to

"freedom." Among them was George P. O'Keefe, head of the international affairs department of Suffridge's union. The RCIA used the ICFTU's International Federation of Clerical and Technical Employees as its instrument for operations in other lands.

Still another trade secretariat of the ICFTU, the International Association of Food and Allied Workers Associations, with headquarters in Geneva, was used as a cover for CIA agents, according to Juul E. Poulson, general secretary of that body (*New York Times*, Feb. 23). Poulson confirmed Victor Reuther's charge of nine months earlier (which was denied by the AFL-CIO Executive Council in August 1966) that eight men in Panama and one in Columbia posed as representatives of his organization, although they were unknown in headquarters. These men, added Poulson, were taking orders from Andrew C. McLellan, AFL-CIO director of Latin-American affairs, working under Lovestone.

The ICFTU's general office, too, figured in the exposure. It was brought out that the Foundation of Youth and Student Affairs, a CIA front through which the NSA received a major part of its subsidies, also listed the ICFTU as one of the organizations it aided (*New York Times*, Feb. 19). Specifics were not given and ICFTU headquarters denied the story. But there was no doubt of the immense CIA sums that were channeled to

ICFTU trade secretariats or their inter-American branches.

The name of Joseph Beirne, president of the American Communications Workers and an AFL-CIO vice-president, came up frequently. He, too, has a long record of involvement in Latin-American committees and operations. He is secretary-treasurer of the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), of which Meany is chairman and the board of which is dominated by 65 businessmen. So infuriated was Beirne by Victor Reuther's charge that AIFLD fronted for the CIA, that he wanted him punished by the AFL-CIO Executive Council. But bit by bit the exposures confirmed the charge that the AIFLD is the major union cover for intelligence in Latin America. The *Washington Post* (Feb. 23) noted that AIFLD's director, William C. Doherty, Jr., is "closely acquainted with CIA operations" but got his principal financial support from the Agency for International Development (AID), totaling \$13 million. Significantly, AIFLD gets no funds from "individual American labor unions," the *Post* noted. Unions contributed a total of only \$11,000 in 1964 and \$500 in 1965.\*

\* In their wire to George Meany, resigning from all AFL-CIO posts, the four top UAW officers also served notice by Walter Reuther of his resignation from the boards of directors of AIFLD and the African-American Labor Council.

A clear pattern emerges. The AFL-CIO or its affiliates use the score of trade secretariats of the ICFTU, usually its inter-American branches or representatives, as covers for involvement in CIA operations. This abuse of the ICFTU's machinery has caused much conflict between Meany and Lovestone and ICFTU headquarters in the past. The exposures heightened the tensions. The claim often voiced that U.S. unions are independent in foreign affairs, has been completely discredited. The anti-Communist policy of Meany and Lovestone has brought the AFL-CIO leadership to a new low. American financial aid has become more suspect than ever to unions abroad.

Supplementing the chain of union-operated CIA-inspired projects are numerous "institutes" and other cold war projects financed by the CIA. Operations and Policy Research, Inc. of Washington is under the presidency of Dr. Evron M. Kirkpatrick and the vice-presidency of Max M. Kampelman. One subsidy for OPR was \$68,000 in 1965 from a CIA foundation (*New York Times*, Feb. 20). Kirkpatrick was Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey's teacher at the University of Minnesota; for a long time he served him as advisor and also campaigned for him in elections. Kampelman was Humphrey's legislative counsel for six years when he was Senator. During that period, Kampelman wrote a book, *The Communist Party vs the*

*CIO* (1958), an extreme red-baiting job that fitted perfectly into the CIA pattern. And that book was published by Fredrick A. Praeger, who has admitted (*New York Times*, Feb. 24) that he issued many books on CIA request and with CIA aid.

The J. M. Kaplan Fund, mentioned often as a conduit of CIA funds, was the channel for about a million dollars for the now defunct Institute of Labor Research, of which Norman Thomas was head. The Socialist leader, too, pleaded ignorance of the source of the funds, although he had some suspicions in the past and was self-critical for not pursuing the inquiry further. The ILR, said Thomas (*New York Times*, Feb. 22), was the "brainchild" of Sacha Volman, who came to the United States after working for Radio Free Europe. He conceived the idea of making the U.S. approach more effective in Latin America through the setting up of "left-of-center" anti-Communist fronts. With the aid of the CIA-financed "left-of-center" image, Volman organized 17 political parties in Latin American lands, according to Thomas. Persons like Thomas were apparently not only unaware of the source of the funds but naively failed to recognize that the CIA tactic of disruption and splitting includes even a "leftish" pose where applicable. That approach was successfully applied in the Dominican situation.

The School of Industrial and Labor Rela-

tions of Cornell University received \$289,500 from CIA foundations in 1961-63. The money went for an International Training Program to prepare union functionaries for international affairs. Among labor men on the board of trustees of that project were George M. Harrison of the Railway Clerks, chairman of the AFL-CIO's International Affairs Committee; the late Michael Ross, who was director of the AFL-CIO's International Affairs Department, and Joseph Beirne. Cornell's relation to AFL-CIO international affairs began earlier. In October 12-17, 1958, the university's School of Industrial and Labor Relations sponsored a conference designed to arouse more labor union interest in U.S. operations in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Lovestone and Harrison were among the speakers at that conference.

CIA expenditures for these varied activities, directly or indirectly under union cover, are coordinated under the direction of Cord Meyer, the CIA man in charge of that field (*Washington Post*, Feb. 23). Drew Pearson in his syndicated column (*New York Post*, Feb. 24) wrote, "Lovestone takes orders from Cord Meyer of the CIA." He noted that Irving Brown's African-American Labor Center "spends CIA money in Africa" and that "ORIT takes direction from Lovestone and with it takes CIA money." Pearson further observed that the International Oil

Workers Union (presumably when Knight headed it) "has handled sizable amounts of CIA money, especially in Indonesia." Pearson also wrote that much CIA money is channeled through the Postal, Telegraph and Telephone International of the ICFTU, with Beirne's active participation. CIA money channeled to labor organizations is "estimated at around \$100,000,000 a year," wrote Pearson.

There is, of course, no way to audit CIA expenditures flowing through labor or any other channels. But the disclosures give some idea of the stream of millions of dollars and of the conspiratorial system for channeling the funds. The CIA has set up numerous dummy foundations from which its funds flow to seemingly legitimate foundations, for distribution to organizations designated by the CIA.

As the details poured out, George Meany and his associates calmly proceeded with their winter Executive Council session in Bal Harbour, Fla. At first, Meany simply disposed of the matter with a statement denying that the AFL-CIO got CIA funds (*New York Times*, Feb. 21). Technically, the AFL-CIO may not be getting CIA subsidies. In fact, the AFL-CIO has a yearly assessment on its 13 million members for a "special purposes fund," the bulk of which passes through Lovestone's department. The AFL-CIO's real contribution is the cover it provides for the

intelligence agencies, which has proven of great service to the CIA. Its money does not go to union treasuries directly, but is channeled through the numerous public covers used for CIA-inspired "labor" activities.

As days passed and more and more unions figured in the exposures, even Meany was forced to tell newsmen he would "look into it" (*New York Times*, Feb. 25). It was similar to President Johnson's hasty designation of CIA director Richard Helms and two cabinet members, to "look into it." Commenting on the President's step, Senator J. W. Fulbright remarked that the choice of Helms to "investigate" the CIA was like naming Secretary of the Treasury Fowler to audit the U.S. Treasury.

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

*George Morris has covered the labor movement as reporter and commentator for over three decades. As editor of the Western Worker from 1932 to 1934, he reported the Maritime and General Strike of 1934 in San Francisco and the wave of farm workers' and unemployed struggles in California in those years. From Detroit in 1935-37, he observed the rise of the United Automobile Workers union and its big sit-down strikes in Flint and other cities. As labor editor of the Daily Worker and The Worker since 1934 he has been a familiar figure at labor conventions, having covered most of the major union gatherings since the late thirties. During extended trips in the USSR in 1959 and 1966 he studied the Soviet trade unions. He is the author of American Labor, Which Way, published in 1961, and of some two-score pamphlets on labor here and abroad. Considered the dean of labor reporters, he enjoys the respect of many trade union leaders for his encyclopedic knowledge of the labor movement and his interpretative reporting.*